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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Fluency. When asking the Oxford English Dictionary about the meaning
of the word ﬂuency, it oﬀers:
1. Auence, copiousness, abundance
2. (a) A smooth and easy ﬂow; readiness, smoothness
(b) Absence of rigidity; ease
3. Readiness of utterance, ﬂow of words
This dissertation is concerned with the second suggested meaning:
ﬂuency as a smooth and easy ﬂow, a feeling of ease. More precisely,
in the work underlying this dissertation I examined diﬀerent aspects of
processing ﬂuency. In psychological terms, processing ﬂuency refers to
the ease with which new information can be processed. For example, a
letter can be written in a font that is easy to read or in a font that is
more difficult to read, making the information in the letter relatively easy
or diﬃcult to process. Similarly, we might be able to process informa-
tion more ﬂuently if we have seen it before. Or when learning a new
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language, some words might be easy to pronounce and some might be
more diﬃcult, for example, think of the Dutch words kip (chicken) and
angstschreeuw (scream of fear). Overall, whenever it is easy to process
such stimuli, we talk about processing ﬂuency whereas disﬂuency refers
to situations when our processing is less smooth.
As you might have realized from these examples, processing ﬂuency
is not about what is being processed, but about how something is pro-
cessed. Rather than being concerned with the content of our cognitions,
processing ﬂuency refers to a metacognitive experience, a momentary
feeling about how our thinking processes are going. Whereas the above
examples of processing ﬂuency mainly involve perceptual processes as
when reading an easy- or diﬃcult-to-read letter, the research underlying
this dissertation examined whether such ﬂuency experiences can equally
be triggered by actual physical interactions with one's environment  or
by a mental simulation of such interactions. For example, imagine how
it feels to use your dominant hand to unlock your apartment door as
compared to using your non-dominant hand.
1.1 Why Investigate Processing Fluency?
You might think that, naturally, if something is easy to read, it's easier
to process. Similarly, you're skilled to use your dominant hand more
than your non-dominant hand, so naturally, that should produce a feel-
ing of ease. So why is it interesting or important to investigate pro-
cessing ﬂuency? Fascinatingly, in all of these examples, the feeling of
ease we experience also exerts an inﬂuence on how we judge the content
of what we are processing. For example, individuals who have to grade
hand-written essays assign better grades if the handwriting is easy to
read than if it is diﬃcult to read (Greifeneder et al., 2010). In other
words, the same essay is judged diﬀerently depending on how easy the
information is to process. Generally, the ﬂuency with which we can pro-
cess information fundamentally aﬀects our evaluation of and our feelings
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towards the information. For instance, a menu can be easy or diﬃcult
to read, stock names can be easy or diﬃcult to pronounce, or aphorisms
can rhyme vs. not. A vast amount of research shows that such ubiqui-
tous cues and their resulting ﬂuency experience aﬀect judgments, as the
dishes on the diﬃcult-to-read menu are thought to require more eﬀort
(Song & Schwarz, 2008b), easy-to-pronounce stock names outperform
diﬃcult-to-pronounce stock names (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006), and
rhyming aphorisms seem truer than non-rhyming aphorisms (McGlone
& Toﬁghbakhsh, 2000). Processing ﬂuency can further lead to feelings of
familiarity (e.g.,Whittlesea & Williams, 1998) and feelings of conﬁdence
(e.g., Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007).
In general, the easier it is for an individual to process a particular
stimulus, the better this stimulus is liked (cf. Alter & Oppenheimer,
2009; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz, Song, & Xu, 2008). This has been most
notably shown for perceptual ﬂuency. For example, Reber and col-
leagues (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998) conducted experiments
in which they manipulated the ease of processing for certain stimuli by
priming their visual contours prior to showing them. Having seen the
contour of a stimulus, participants should be able to process the stimulus
itself more easily. As expected, this processing ease then inﬂuenced par-
ticipants' liking ratings: They liked the stimuli better after a matching
contour prime than after a mismatching prime.
Moreover, the experience of ﬂuency seems to lead to a general pos-
itive aﬀective response, as illustrated by another set of experiments
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001): Participants saw line drawings which
were again preceded by matching or mismatching primes. While viewing
the drawings, participants' facial expressions were recorded using elec-
tromyography (EMG) to measure the zygomaticus major (cheek) and
corrugator supercilii (brow) muscle activations, and after viewing each
drawing, participants explicitly rated their aﬀective response toward
it. Easy-to-process stimuli, namely those following a matching prime,
elicited a positive aﬀective response as indicated by an increase in the
zygomaticus major activity (the muscle involved in smiling), whereas
3
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diﬃcult-to-process stimuli did not. The participants' explicit evalua-
tions of the stimuli mirrored these physiological ﬁndings.
Thus, overall, it seems like the ﬂuency or ease with which individ-
uals can process information inﬂuences their liking of it, their aﬀect in
general, and even a range of other judgments related to the informa-
tion, such as its truth value. Thus, although it is commonly assumed
that individuals use objective information to judge information, the re-
search on ﬂuency suggests that a subtle and seemingly irrelevant cue as
one's ease of processing the information, can exert an inﬂuence on judg-
ments and decision making. Such ﬂuency signals have been suggested to
be hedonically marked, in other words, ﬂuency is experienced as some-
thing positive, because it says something about a positive or negative
state of aﬀairs, either in the world or within the cognitive system (p.
203, Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Recent evi-
dence suggests that ﬂuency might not merely be positive, but it might
more generally signal that something is particularly informative or us-
able (Häfner & Stapel, 2010).
In sum, ﬂuency experiences are functional in that they inform us
about ongoing cognitions. Therefore, it is relevant to study both the
conditions under which such ﬂuency experiences arise and the poten-
tial consequences of these experiences on judgments, decision making,
our cognitive processes in general, and even behavior. The research
described in this dissertation contributes to various aspects of these re-
search questions.
1.2 Fluency From the Motor System
As the examples above already suggest, it seems like any variable that
can facilitate information processing produces feelings of ﬂuency (see
also Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), for example, readability, pronounca-
bility, and rhyming all had eﬀects on how the information was judged.
4
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In the current research, I was interested in whether such ﬂuency ex-
periences can also arise as a result of actual, anticipated, or simulated
interactions with one's environment.
The premise underlying all of the empirical work presented in this
dissertation is that any perceptual or cognitive process serves action (cf.
Clark, 1997; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Prinz,
1997; E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004). For example, when we see a cup
standing on the table in front of us, we don't just think There is a cup
standing on the table., but on some (probably unconscious) level, we
also think about what we could do with this cup, for example, how we
could pick it up. Tucker and Ellis (1998) refer to this as the potentiation
of possible actions, implying a sense of preparedness to act. For example,
when the cup's handle is oriented to the right, a right-hand grasp is
easier than a left-hand grasp. Unconsciously, we therefore automatically
potentiate a right-hand grasp (more than a left-hand grasp), meaning
that when we then actually act on the cup, we are faster when using
the right hand than the left (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Importantly, this is
not merely an eﬀect of being right- or left-handed, but it works equally
on the other side, such that a left-hand grasp is potentiated when the
cup's handle is oriented toward the left.
The idea that our perception prepares for action in this sense is best
accounted for by economic theories of perception (cf. Gibson, 1979;
see also Proﬃtt, 2006). Accordingly, perception serves action in that
it informs about the opportunities for possible actions and about the
costs associated with these actions. Gibson's ecological approach to
perception (1979) proposes that the mere perception of an object leads
to the activation of possible actions one could perform with this object.
He referred to such perceived action opportunities as aﬀordances. Thus,
in the example above, a right-hand grasp is said to be more aﬀorded than
a left-hand grasp when the cup's handle is oriented toward the right.
Proﬃtt (2006) suggested that such aﬀordances in visual perception are
adaptive, because by informing us not only about the opportunities for
5
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action, but also about the associated costs, energy can be saved  or at
least used in the most eﬃcient manner.
The following two chapters of this dissertation deal with the ques-
tion whether such action aﬀordances can give rise to ﬂuency experiences
paralleling those triggered by simple perceptual manipulations as in the
examples given above (e.g., the readability of an essay). Based on the
assumption that ﬂuency experiences and their aﬀective consequences
arise as a result of feeling that one's processing is easy, smooth, and
eﬀortless, I predicted that similar eﬀects should be found when acting
in line with the aﬀordances perceived in the environment. If it is true
that possible and likely actions are automatically potentiated upon the
perception of an object (Gibson, 1979; Tucker & Ellis, 1998), acting in
line with the potentiated actions should be notably easier than perform-
ing a diﬀerent action and should therefore produce a feeling of ﬂuency.
Moreover, in analogy to the eﬀects of perceptual ﬂuency, the experience
of such motor ﬂuency should also aﬀect other outcome variables. In
other words, grabbing the cup which is oriented toward the right with
your right hand should not only be easier, but it should also feel bet-
ter. Speciﬁcally, mirroring previously established eﬀects of processing
ﬂuency, I hypothesized that:
1. One should like an object better if it is easier to interact with this
object.
2. One should feel more positive after acting in line with perceived
aﬀordances than after acting against such aﬀordances.
3. Acting in line with perceived aﬀordances should generally produce
a feeling of processing ﬂuency.
4. One should prefer an object over an alternative if one anticipates
an easier interaction with it.
Recent research has provided initial support for Hypothesis 1: In an
experiment, participants moved simple household items from one posi-
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tion to another  either with an obstacle in the way, therefore disﬂuently,
or without an obstacle, therefore ﬂuently (A. E. Hayes, Paul, Beuger,
& Tipper, 2008). They then rated how much they liked each object
compared to other imaginable objects of its kind. Participants liked
the objects from ﬂuent actions better than the objects from disﬂuent
actions. Thus, the physical dynamics of interacting with the objects
aﬀected the extent to which participants liked them. In support of
Hypothesis 2, Cannon, Hayes, and Tipper (2010) showed that actions
congruent with perceived aﬀordances can produce positive aﬀect. Par-
ticipants had to classify whether objects belong into the kitchen or the
garage. Similar to the above example of the cups, these objects were por-
trayed with a left- or rightward orientation, therefore better aﬀording
a left- or right-hand grasp. In correspondence to the perceptual ﬂu-
ency eﬀects by Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001), Cannon et al. (2010)
found that grasp-compatible responses lead to an increased activity of
the zygomaticus major muscle, suggesting that participants (implicitly)
experienced positive aﬀect.
In Chapter 2 of the current dissertation, I aimed to replicate this with
another measure of aﬀect. Furthermore, I sought to ﬁnd support for Hy-
pothesis 3. In two experiments, I employed a similar stimulus-response
paradigm, in which participants had to indicate whether an object was
portrayed upright or inverted. In addition to the invertedness dimen-
sion, the objects were portrayed with a left- or rightward orientation
(cf. Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Whereas previous research has convincingly
demonstrated that actions congruent with perceived aﬀordances are in-
deed easier (Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004; Symes, Ellis, & Tucker,
2007), I thus aimed to show that  similar to other ﬂuency experiences
 they also produce a positive feeling, and more importantly, that they
are indeed based on the experience of subjective processing ﬂuency. The
ﬁndings of both experiments support the idea that processing ﬂuency
can be grounded in the motor system.
Chapter 3 of this dissertation addresses Hypothesis 4. I predicted
that when one is faced with two action alternatives, the more ﬂuent
7
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alternative should be preferred. Imagine, for example, that you are going
to play table-tennis and you can choose the side to play at. Imagine
further, that you are standing by the net, exactly in the middle between
the two sides. All other things being equal, it really shouldn't matter
what side of the table-tennis table you choose. However, I argue that if
perception is truly action-driven, one is likely to run a motor simulation
of each action alternative (cf. Witt & Proﬃtt, 2008 ). Thus, one should
(unconsciously) simulate what it would be like to go to either side of
the table-tennis table. I propose that in a situation like the table-tennis
example, the simulation will also include your play-hand. Thus, if you
are right-handed, it should seem easier to go to the right side of the table
because merely extending the arm on the side of your play-hand already
covers half of the distance to get to that side. Chapter 3 describes
two experiments using a paradigm which involved exactly this choice
between playing on the left and the right side of a table-tennis table.
I predicted that the simulation of the diﬀerent action alternatives is
enough to create an aﬀordance situation, which can produce ﬂuency
eﬀects, such that the easiest  the least costly  course of action is
preferred.
Initial evidence suggests that preference judgments can be groun-
ded in the motor system (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Bergh, Vrana, & Eelen,
1990): Typists repeatedly chose one of two letter dyads, which were ma-
nipulated, such that typists would usually type the two letters with the
same hand (e.g., FV) or with diﬀerent hands (e.g., FJ). They preferred
diﬀerent-hand letter dyads over same-hand letter dyads, suggesting that
simulating diﬀerent-hand dyads is more aﬀorded than simulating same-
hand dyads, because the associated action is easier.
Chapter 3 poses an important extension of the previously outlined
function and characteristics of aﬀordances in determining ﬂuency out-
comes. First, the mere anticipation of a ﬂuent (inter)action should be
enough to drive preferences. Second, the derived aﬀordances should dif-
fer as individuals' bodily capabilities diﬀer. Thus, what should seem
ﬂuent to one individual and therefore be preferred, might not be ﬂuent
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for another individual. For example a right-handed person should pre-
fer the right side of the table, but a left-handed person should prefer
the left. Furthermore, when contextually constraining an individual's
action capabilities, for example, by instructing right-handed individuals
to imagine playing with their left hand, the simulated aﬀordance struc-
ture should change accordingly, leading to a diﬀerent preference decision.
In line with this, a growing body of research suggests that a person's
contextual action capabilities inﬂuence perception. For example, hills
look steeper when carrying a heavy backpack (Bhalla & Proﬃtt, 1999)
or targets look further away when throwing heavy balls to them than
when throwing light balls to them (Witt, Proﬃtt, & Epstein, 2004).
My ﬁndings of Chapter 3 suggest that individuals make use of physical
cues  aﬀordances  to derive preferences and that these cues are situ-
ated and emerge within the dynamics between the individual and the
environment.
1.3 Fluency from Multimodal Conceptual
Thought
Overall, the research discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 suggests that ﬂuency
experiences can be triggered by the motor system. Smooth interactions
with objects feel ﬂuent and produce positive aﬀect and individuals prefer
actions for which they anticipate ﬂuency. These ﬁndings hence support
the view that perception is situated and action-driven and that even
preferences are prone to such action eﬀects (cf. Prinz, 1997; E. R. Smith
& Semin, 2004).
However, one might argue that while this applies to perception in
such concrete situations, the reported research is silent on the role of
actions or the body in conceptual thought, for instance in language com-
prehension. Reading a sentence like The lemon tastes sour. implies
no real, physical interaction with or action on an object or the envi-
ronment. Nevertheless, perceptual theories of knowledge propose that
9
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even the way we understand language and how we mentally represent
concepts is in the service of perception and action  and therefore heav-
ily contingent on perceptual variables (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997).
Ultimately, the question about the underpinnings of conceptual thought
is the question of how meaning is mentally represented and derived. Ac-
cording to perceptual theories of knowledge, concepts must be grounded
in physical experiences. Glenberg (1997), for instance, argued that we
understand language by creating embodied conceptualizations of situa-
tions the language is describing (p. 12). Similarly, Barsalou's (1999)
theory of perceptual symbol systems (PSS) assumes that we represent
concepts by partially re-enacting experiences we had with them. Impor-
tantly, PSS argues that these re-enactments are componential, dynamic,
and modality-speciﬁc. Thus, depending on the situation at hand, the
meaning  and thus the representation  of a concept is dynamically
adapted. For example, when oﬀered a glass of lemon juice, one might
particularly think about how lemons taste sour. However, while arrang-
ing a lemon with other fruits to prepare a nice fruit basket, the current
representation of the concept lemon might include its shape (where
would the lemon ﬁt) or its color (it might look nicer next to a red ap-
ple than next to a yellow banana) rather than its taste. In this sense,
conceptual thought can be conceived of as just as situated, perceptual,
and action-driven as actual physical interactions (cf. Barsalou, 2003;
Yeh & Barsalou, 2006; Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & Aveyard, 2004).
Therefore, the research discussed in Chapter 4 explored how ﬂuency
experiences can arise from conceptual thought. Particularly, the pre-
sented research is based on the assumption that language comprehension
is situated and modality-speciﬁc. Thus, for example, when reading the
sentence The lemon tastes sour., our representation of a lemon should
primarily include the gustatory modality, whereas the representation of
the sentence The lemon is yellow. should primarily include the visual
modality. Evidence for such modality-speciﬁc processing comes from ex-
periments in which participants repeatedly read such sentences and had
to verify whether the property (e.g., sour) is typically true of the con-
cept. Interestingly, when two subsequent sentences involved the same
10
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modality, for example, The lemon is sour. followed by The sand-
wich is savory. participants processed the sentences faster than when
the two subsequent sentences involved diﬀerent modalities, for instance
when the sentence The lemon is sour. is followed by the sentence The
water is wet. (Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003).
Although prior research has convincingly demonstrated these pro-
cessing costs associated with modality switching in conceptual thought
(Pecher et al., 2003; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2004; Van Dantzig,
Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2008), I propose that including several
modalities in the representation of a concept will make it easier to de-
rive the concept's meaning than if fewer modalities are involved in the
concept's representation. We should better be able to understand what
a lemon is, if we simultaneously know that it is yellow and tastes sour,
a visual and a gustatory property, than if we know that it is yellow and
oval, two visual properties. Therefore, I argue that a concept represen-
tation involving several diﬀerent modalities becomes semantically richer
than a representation involving only a single modality. In other contexts,
semantic richness has been linked to processing ﬂuency (Gill, Swan, &
Silvera, 1998; Myers, O'Brien, Balota, & Toyofuku, 1984; E. E. Smith,
Adams, & Schorr, 1978). Thus, as a concept's representation becomes
richer, it should become more accessible, leading to the experience of
processing ﬂuency. After processing concepts within a multi-modal con-
text, I hence expected to ﬁnd an inﬂuence of this ﬂuency experience on
aﬀective variables. Particularly, I hypothesized that:
5. Concepts encoded within a multi-modal processing context gain
more meaning and thus a richer semantic representation.
6. Multi-modality processing generates a positive feeling.
7. A concept encoded with a number of multi-modal properties is
liked more than a concept encoded with properties from a single
modality.
11
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I addressed these hypotheses in Chapter 4. My ﬁndings are in line
with situated, embodied accounts of cognition, which assume concept
representations to be dynamic. The chapter further provides experimen-
tal evidence that this representational ﬂexibility has implications for an
individual's processing experience per se.
1.4 Fluency and Self-Regulation
The diﬀerent lines of research outlined so far have in common that ﬂu-
ency is seen as a functional property of our processing experience. It
can inform us about the ease with which we can expect to interact in
a situation or with which we can derive meaning from a sentence. In
Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I take a diﬀerent approach to directly
assess the functional value of processing ﬂuency. In most of the re-
search on processing ﬂuency, the experiments are designed such that a
ﬂuent condition is compared to a disﬂuent condition. Therefore, it is
unclear whether the eﬀects reported in such experiments are due to an
experience of ﬂuency or actually due to an experience of disﬂuency. Nev-
ertheless, most results are interpreted as a function of ﬂuent processing,
such that information, for example, becomes liked more, seems more
true, or is more valued. I don't deny the possibility that experiencing
ﬂuency can trigger genuine positive aﬀect  and the physiological data
reported by Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) support this possibility.
However, I assume that ﬂuency experiences are generally informative
about one's ongoing cognitions. Therefore, particularly the experience
of disﬂuency should be relevant for self-monitoring and self-regulation.
Disﬂuency indicates that the current situation is somehow problematic,
that something in the current processing context isn't going right.
Therefore, in line with theories of situated cognition (cf. Schwarz, 2002;
E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004), which assume that our cognitive processes
are tuned to situational requirements, disﬂuency might signal the need
to adapt one's current processing style (cf. Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz &
12
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Clore, 1996), for example to invest more eﬀort or to adapt a diﬀerent pro-
cessing strategy. In sum, I propose that particularly the metacognitive
feeling of disﬂuency provides an internal feedback signal about ongoing
cognitive processes which serves self-control (cf. Metcalfe & Shima-
mura, 1994; Mazzoni & Nelson, 1998; see also Winkielman, Schwarz, &
Nowak, 2002). Drawing on the resource model of self-control (Muraven
& Baumeister, 2000), I expected that if disﬂuency indicates the need to
upregulate self-control, the limited resources available for self-regulation
in general would be unavailable on a subsequent task. I therefore hy-
pothesized that:
8. Experiencing disﬂuency depletes self-regulatory resources. There-
fore, an individual is less able to exert self-control after an expe-
rience of disﬂuency.
Chapter 5 discusses two experiments which address this hypothesis.
After a manipulation of perceptual ﬂuency, participants' capacity for
self-control was assessed. My ﬁndings corroborate the idea that ﬂuency
experiences are important for self-regulation.
1.5 Summary
The present dissertation is about diﬀerent antecedents and consequences
of processing ﬂuency. While most research on processing ﬂuency has in-
vestigated what happens when thinking is diﬃcult (cf. Schwarz et
al., 2008), Chapters 2 and 3 address what happens when doing is diﬃ-
cult. Particularly, I show that the intimate link between perception and
action can give rise to ﬂuency experiences when actions are congruent
with perceived capabilities. Chapter 4 illustrates that although language
comprehension is initially hampered when many diﬀerent modalities are
involved during processing, the resulting multi-modal concept represen-
tations ultimately facilitate the construction of meaning. Therefore, as
13
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with any processing variable (cf. Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), this
facilitation produces ﬂuency experiences.
The reported research is consistent with the idea that perception
and cognition generally serve action (Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997;
E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004). Therefore, ﬂuency is functional in that
it rewards easy  and hence energy-conserving  actions and process-
ing (see Chapters 2 and 4) and in that it promotes such actions (see
Chapter 3). Chapter 5 addresses a possible consequence of processing
disﬂuency. If ﬂuency experiences are about adapting one's processing to
the characteristics and requirements of the situation with the ultimate
goal to preserve energy and act cost-eﬀectively (cf. Proﬃtt, 2006), then
the feeling of disﬂuency should signal the need to change something in
the current situation. Chapter 5 therefore demonstrates directly that
processing diﬃculty plays a role in self-regulation.
Thus, ﬂuency experiences seem to be hedonically marked to reward
the least costly course of processing or action, but equally, disﬂuency
experiences seem to contribute to self-regulation by driving a cognitive
and/or behavioral change. The current dissertation explores these is-
sues within the experiences of sensorimotor ﬂuency, anticipated action
ﬂuency, conceptual ﬂuency, and perceptual ﬂuency with outcomes on
perceived ﬂuency, aﬀect, choice preferences, liking judgments for the
targets of processing, and self-regulatory depletion.
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2Chapter 2
The Groove Move: Action
Aﬀordances Produce Fluency
and Positive Aﬀect
This chapter is based on:
Regenberg, N.F.E., Häfner, M., & Semin, G.R. (in press). The groove move: Action
aﬀordances produce ﬂuency and positive aﬀect. Experimental Psychology
Sensible Moves
Abstract
In two experiments we show that the experience of processing
ﬂuency can be grounded in the motor system. We manipu-
lated whether responses in a stimulus-response paradigm were
congruent or incongruent with the orientation of graspable
objects. Besides the typical aﬀordance eﬀect (Tucker & Ellis,
1998), namely a reaction time advantage for responses made
with the hand for which it would be easier to grasp the object,
our results reveal that such visuo-motor congruence elicits
positive aﬀect when preceded by incongruent trials (Exper-
iment 1). Experiment 2 demonstrates that individuals are
aware of this ﬂuency experience and can consciously report
on it. Moreover, by manipulating the task contingencies, we
show that the aﬀordance eﬀect itself can be modulated by
the experience of processing ﬂuency. Our results are in line
with theories assuming a direct coupling between perception
and action (Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997; E. R. Smith &
Semin, 2004).
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In many every-day situations, we like things better when they are
easy to process or do. For example, we like a well structured talk that is
easy to follow more than a badly structured presentation and we prefer
buying tickets from a vending machine that is easy to use to one that
requires a lot of cognitive eﬀort. Generally, the ﬂuency with which we
can process information fundamentally aﬀects our evaluation of and our
feelings towards the information. Such processing dynamics can have an
inﬂuence on measures of objective ﬂuency, namely an objectively quan-
tiﬁable processing advantage of ﬂuent over disﬂuent stimuli (e.g., Reber
et al., 1998; Tucker & Ellis, 1998), on measures of subjective ﬂuency,
such as a perceived feeling of ease (e.g., Song & Schwarz, 2008b), and on
evaluative and aﬀective measures, such as liking judgments of a target
stimulus (e.g., Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968) or implicit mood measures
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). Whereas most research on ﬂuency has
investigated ﬂuency eﬀects as triggered by information processing, in the
present research, we explore whether ﬂuency experiences can arise from
physical interactions with objects. We demonstrate that physical inter-
actions that are smooth and eﬀortless have similar consequences, as they
produce a cognitive processing advantage for the object and they elicit a
positive aﬀective response. Moreover, the goal of the present research is
to show that these consequences indeed coincide with a meta-cognitive
feeling of ease, namely the experience of subjective processing ﬂuency.
Our research question hinges on the premise that cognition serves
action (cf. E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004) and that therefore perception
and action are ultimately linked. As similarly proposed by the ecological
approach to perception (Gibson, 1979), we assume that the mere per-
ception of an object leads to the activation of possible actions one could
perform with this object. For example, when we see a coﬀee mug on the
kitchen table, we automatically potentiate associated actions, such as
grabbing it and picking it up. This has been convincingly demonstrated
in experiments on the aﬀordance eﬀect with a stimulus-response (S-R)
compatibility paradigm (Tucker & Ellis, 1998): Participants saw gras-
pable household objects like mugs or frying pans and made judgments
about whether they were upright or inverted using their left or right
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hand. In addition to the invertedness dimension, the objects were dis-
played with a left- or rightward orientation. If the object's action pos-
sibilities, or aﬀordances, are automatically potentiated, this should be
reﬂected in a processing advantage on trials where the response hand is
congruent with the object's horizontal orientation as compared to trials
where the response hand is incongruent with the object's orientation.
Indeed, participants responded faster when they made the response with
the hand for which it would be easier to grasp an object, although this
was irrelevant to the judgment. Further experiments have demonstrated
that, in general, when we act congruently with an object's visual ac-
tion aﬀordances, as its orientation or size, these interactions are faster
than when the performed actions are incongruent with the object's af-
fordances (cf. Symes et al., 2007; Tucker & Ellis, 2001, 2004). These
S-R compatibility eﬀects illustrate how objective ﬂuency, namely an ob-
jective processing advantage, can arise from the compatibility between
perceived aﬀordances and motor responses: When we act in line with
such object aﬀordances, our actions are noticeably easier than when we
act against such aﬀordances.
The aim of the current experiments is to show that over and above
facilitating information processing, the perceived ease of interacting with
our environment has also subjective consequences by triggering an aﬀec-
tive response and a meta-cognitive feeling of ﬂuency. First, we hypoth-
esize that if actions are automatically potentiated upon the perception
of an object, motor responses congruent with these actions should not
only be measurably easier, that is, faster, but they should also elicit a
positive feeling. Conversely, due to the increased amount of cognitive
eﬀort necessary to perform motor responses not in line with perceived
action aﬀordances, such S-R incompatibilities are likely to elicit a more
negative feeling. Second, we hypothesize that the perceived ease of in-
teracting with one's environment directly results in a meta-cognitive
feeling, namely the subjective experience of processing ﬂuency.
In general, previous research on ﬂuency eﬀects has suggested that
such subjectively experienced outcomes are not necessarily directly as-
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sociated with diﬀerences in objective processing ﬂuency, but are instead
the result of an experienced discrepancy between one's expected and
actually experienced ﬂuency of processing. For example, a classic ef-
fect of processing ﬂuency is that ﬂuently processed stimuli feel more
familiar than disﬂuently processed stimuli (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse,
1989; Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990). However, Whittlesea and
Williams (1998, 2000; Whittlesea, 2004) have demonstrated that the
feeling of familiarity is not driven by the objective processing ﬂuency per
se, but instead arises when the processing ﬂuency is unexpected in the
particular task or context. In support of this discrepancy-attribution
hypothesis, other subjective outcomes of processing ﬂuency as prefer-
ences (S. Willems & Linden, 2006), truth judgments (Hansen, Dechêne,
& Wänke, 2008), judgments of morality (Laham, Alter, & Goodwin,
2009), or attitude judgments (Hansen & Wänke, 2008) can be similarly
moderated by expectations and the task context.
Therefore, in the context of an S-R compatibility paradigm, as the
aforementioned aﬀordance task, we expect that the experience of subjec-
tive processing ﬂuency is driven by the discrepancy between one's actual
processing ﬂuency and the expected ease of processing as created by the
current task context. We expect individuals to experience ﬂuency and
a positive feeling when S-R compatible trials follow S-R incompatible
trials, thereby creating a discrepantly ﬂuent experience as compared to
stimulus sequences in which S-R incompatible trials follow S-R compat-
ible trials, which should produce a feeling of discrepant disﬂuency and
a more negative feeling state.
The idea that such dynamics of our interactions with the world in-
ﬂuence how we feel ﬁnds ample support in the research on perceptual
and processing ﬂuency (cf. Winkielman et al., 2002, 2003). Fluency is
usually conceptualized as the perceived ease of processing. The easier it
is for an individual to process a particular stimulus, the better this stim-
ulus is liked. This has been most notably shown for perceptual ﬂuency.
For example, Reber, et al. (1998) conducted experiments in which they
manipulated the ease of processing for certain stimuli, e.g., by priming
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their visual contours prior to showing them (Exp. 1). Participants liked
the stimuli better in the easy processing conditions than in the more dif-
ﬁcult processing conditions. Moreover, the experience of ﬂuency seems
to lead to a general positive aﬀective response as captured by physiolog-
ical measures (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001): Participants rated their
aﬀective reactions to line drawings, which were preceded by matching vs.
mismatching primes, while facial expressions were recorded using elec-
tromyography (EMG) measuring the participants' zygomaticus major
(cheek) and corrugator supercilii (brow) activations. Easy-to-process
stimuli, i.e., those following a matching prime, elicited a positive af-
fective response as indicated by an increase in the zygomaticus major
activity, whereas diﬃcult-to-process stimuli did not. The participants'
explicit evaluations of the stimuli mirrored these physiological ﬁndings.
Overall, individuals seem to be sensitive not only to what they are
processing, but also to how they are processing, such that variables that
facilitate processing lead to increased liking for the target and/or posi-
tive aﬀect. In the current research, we investigate whether such ﬂuency
is equally experienced when motor actions are facilitated through the
perceptual features of a stimulus. Imagine a cup whose handle is ori-
ented toward the right is standing in front of you. It should be easier to
grab the cup with the right hand than with the left hand. We expect
that the perceived ease of interacting with the cup when grabbing it with
the right hand leads to a more positive feeling than when grabbing it
with the left hand. In line with the discrepancy-attribution hypothesis
outlined above, we expect this eﬀect when the experienced processing
ﬂuency deviates from the processing ﬂuency in the immediate task con-
text and thereby becomes particularly salient. For example, the positive
feeling should particularly arise when participants use their right hand
to reach for the cup whose handle is oriented toward the right (S-R
compatible) after having previously reached for other objects with their
hands that were opposite to the objects' orientations (S-R incompati-
ble). Thus, we expect the eﬀect to be contingent on the current task
properties and expectations.
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Recent research has provided initial support for the idea that aﬀec-
tive reactions can be inﬂuenced by motor ﬂuency eﬀects: In an experi-
ment, participants moved simple household items from one position to
another  either with an obstacle in the way, i.e., disﬂuently, or without
an obstacle, i.e., ﬂuently (A. E. Hayes et al., 2008). They then rated
how much they liked each object compared to other imaginable objects
of its kind. Participants liked the objects from ﬂuent actions better than
the objects from disﬂuent actions. Thus, the physical dynamics of inter-
acting with the objects aﬀected the extent to which participants liked
them. Similarly, Cannon et al. (2010) showed that in a speeded catego-
rization task S-R compatible responses to graspable stimuli lead to more
positive implicit aﬀect than S-R incompatible responses as measured by
EMG of the zygomaticus major muscle. In the present work, we sought
to show more directly that such S-R compatibility eﬀects are indeed
based on the experience of subjective ﬂuency, i.e., that participants can
report a meta-cognitive feeling of ﬂuency.
In sum, our research is based on the premise that perception serves
action such that perceiving objects automatically leads to an activation
of possible motor actions. In an S-R compatibility paradigm, during
which action aﬀordances to objects are activated, this should be re-
ﬂected in an objective processing advantage when the required motor
response matches the most activated aﬀordances, as illustrated by the
classic aﬀordance eﬀect (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Second, we expect that
discrepant visuo-motor ﬂuency is accompanied by a more positive feeling
state than discrepant disﬂuency. Finally, we aim to provide direct evi-
dence for the assumption that these aﬀective consequences are grounded
in a meta-cognitive feeling of processing ﬂuency.
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2.1 Experiment 1: Aﬀective Consequences of Visuo-
Motor Fluency
We used an aﬀordance task (Tucker & Ellis, 1998, Experiment 1) to
explore whether compatibility between the perceptual features of the
stimuli, namely their orientation, and their required motor response can
produce subjective ﬂuency eﬀects. Particularly, we investigated the af-
fective consequences of this visuo-motor ﬂuency. The experimental task
consisted of sequences of aﬀordance task trials, which were either dis-
crepantly ﬂuent, discrepantly disﬂuent, or neutral. We hypothesized
that when participants execute a series of S-R compatible responses
after a series of S-R incompatible responses (discrepant ﬂuency), they
experience more positive aﬀect than when performing a series of S-R
incompatible responses after a series of S-R compatible responses (dis-
crepant disﬂuency). To assess the hypothesized aﬀective consequences,
participants evaluated the valence of Chinese ideographs (cf. Murphy
& Zajonc, 1993) after series of four S-R compatible or four S-R incom-
patible actions. We expected participants to be more likely to assign a
positive valence to the Chinese ideographs after performing discrepantly
ﬂuent than after performing discrepantly disﬂuent sequences.
2.1.1 Method
Participants
Eighteen university students (three male) participated in the experiment
for a small monetary reward or course credit.
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Stimuli and aﬀordance task
We created images of 32 common household objects with an intrinsic
orientation toward the left or right through a graspable handle, for ex-
ample, cups, jugs, and coﬀee pots. The objects were approximately 500
× 500 pixels large and displayed in gray-scale on a white background.
Each image was mirrored to create four diﬀerent versions: a leftward
and a rightward orientation and standing upright or inverted. Thus,
we had 23 × 2 (orientation) × 2 (invertedness) = 92 diﬀerent images.
During the aﬀordance task, participants saw one object at a time and
indicated whether the object was upright or inverted by responding with
their left or right hand. Additionally, the objects appeared with a left-
or rightward orientation.
Design and procedure
Participants always responded to series of four aﬀordance task trials.
Within these four trials either all required an S-R compatible response
or an S-R incompatible response. The response hands and the object
orientations were counterbalanced, such that two responses were to be
made with the left hand and two with the right hand and two objects
had a leftward and two a rightward orientation. After each such series,
participants judged whether the meaning of a Chinese ideograph was
likely to be negative or positive on a vertically displayed 6-point scale
from 1 (extremely negative) to 6 (extremely positive). Additionally,
we manipulated the response mapping within-participants across two
experimental blocks, i.e., whether participants made the upright judg-
ment with their left hand and the inverted judgment with their right
hand or vice versa. They saw a total of 20 S-R compatible and 20 S-R
incompatible series within each mapping, i.e., a total 2 (mapping) ×40
(series of aﬀordance task trials) ×4 (trials per series) = 320 aﬀordance
task trials.
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We chose this design to keep the task as simple as possible: Partici-
pants always performed only four trials before they answered the ques-
tion about the Chinese ideograph. However, as we expect the aﬀective
consequences of visuo-motor ﬂuency to arise as a result of a discrepant
ﬂuency experience, we analyzed the data in terms of sequences of dis-
crepant ﬂuency (a series of four S-R incompatible trials followed by a
series of four S-R compatible trials, 25.2% of all sequences), discrepant
disﬂuency (a series of four S-R compatible trials followed by a series of
four S-R incompatible trials, 24.3% of all sequences), and neutral con-
trol sequences (two series of S-R compatible or S-R incompatible trials
following each other, 50.5% of all sequences).
2.1.2 Results
Response times and accuracy during the aﬀordance task
We analyzed the reaction time data in a 2 (mapping: left-hand: upright
vs. right-hand: upright) by 3 (ﬂuency sequence: discrepantly ﬂuent,
neutral, discrepantly disﬂuent) repeated measures ANOVA while ex-
cluding errors and reaction times more than 2 SD from the respective
condition mean. The analysis revealed only a trend for the expected
aﬀordance eﬀect, F (2, 34) = 2.37, p = .107, η2p = .123. Participants
responded slightly faster to discrepantly ﬂuent sequences (M = 676.87,
SD = 112.87) than to discrepantly disﬂuent sequences (M = 695.10,
SD = 115.53), F (1, 17) = 2.65, p = .122, η2p = .14. Participants'
responses did not diﬀer between ﬂuent and neutral sequences (M =
677.51, SD = 120.08), F (1, 17) < 1, but participants were faster on neu-
tral than on disﬂuent sequences, F (1, 17) = 4.73, p = .044, η2p = .218.
No other eﬀects emerged. A parallel 2 (mapping) ×3 (ﬂuency sequence)
analysis of participants' accuracy rates yielded no eﬀects, main eﬀect
of ﬂuency: F (2, 34) = 1.14, p = .331, η2p = .06, both other Fs < 1,
rendering a speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ unlikely.
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Figure 2.1: Mean evaluation of chinese ideographs (1 = extremely negative; 6 =
extremely positive) as a function of the ﬂuency sequence in Experi-
ment 1.
Aﬀect
Given the simplicity of the task, we excluded sequences in which par-
ticipants committed an error on the aﬀordance task and analyzed the
Chinese ideograph evaluations in a repeated measures ANOVA as a func-
tion of the ﬂuency sequence. The analysis yielded the expected eﬀect of
discrepant ﬂuency, F (2, 34) = 3.65, p = .037, η2p = .18. Planned com-
parisons revealed that participants evaluated the ideographs more posi-
tively after ﬂuent sequences (M = 3.71, SD = 0.32) than after disﬂuent
sequences (M = 3.41, SD = 0.53), F (1, 17) = 4.93, p = .040, η2p = .23.
Ideographs evaluated after neutral sequences were descriptively seen as
more positive than after disﬂuent sequences and as more negative than
after ﬂuent sequences (M = 3.58, SD = 0.44), although the diﬀerences
failed to reach signiﬁcance, contrast ﬂuent-neutral: F (1, 17) = 1.80,
p = .198, η2p = .10; contrast disﬂuent-neutral: F (1, 17) = 3.00, p = .101,
η2p = .15. The overall pattern is displayed in Figure 2.1.
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2.1.3 Discussion
Participants performed an aﬀordance task, in which series of compatible
and incompatible responses followed each other, creating discrepantly
ﬂuent, discrepantly disﬂuent, and neutral task sequences. We assessed
the hypothesis that discrepantly ﬂuent motor responses would induce
positive aﬀect compared to discrepantly disﬂuent responses. As pre-
dicted, participants evaluated the meaning of Chinese ideographs as
more positive after ﬂuent than after disﬂuent sequences.
With our modiﬁed version of the aﬀordance task we did not ﬁnd
a strong aﬀordance eﬀect on response latencies, although our results
suggest diﬀerences in the expected direction: Participants responded
slightly faster on discrepantly ﬂuent trials than on discrepantly disﬂu-
ent trials. Given the procedure of our task, it is not surprising that
the reaction time eﬀect overall is weaker than in previous research (cf.
Tucker & Ellis, 1998) because participants always performed only four
congruent or four incongruent aﬀordance task trials in a row. Further-
more, due to the counterbalancing at least the fourth response will have
become predictable, making it less likely to ﬁnd reaction time eﬀects.1
Nevertheless, the experiment showed that the experience of visuo-motor
ﬂuency leads to a positive feeling when the ﬂuency experience positively
deviates from the immediately preceding experience.
2.2 Experiment 2: Objective and Subjective Flu-
ency Experiences
We conducted a second experiment to examine the dynamics of the
visuo-motor ﬂuency eﬀect found in Experiment 1. Whereas previous
research has similarly shown that acting in line with action aﬀordances
1In fact, when conducting the same 2 (mapping) × 3 (ﬂuency) analysis on partici-
pants' reaction times while omitting the fourth trial of each series, the eﬀect becomes
slightly stronger, F (2, 34) = 2.55, p = .093, η2p = .13.
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has aﬀective consequences (Cannon et al., 2010; A. E. Hayes et al.,
2008), we designed this experiment to provide more direct evidence for
the existence of motor-ﬂuency eﬀects by asking participants to report
on their processing experience. We employed a similar aﬀordance task
paradigm as in Experiment 1, but increased the number of trials partic-
ipants performed in a row to be able to replicate the typical aﬀordance
eﬀect. We expected to ﬁnd an eﬀect of objective processing ﬂuency, such
that S-R compatible trials are responded to faster than S-R incompat-
ible trials. Furthermore, we manipulated the aﬀordance task sequences
to be discrepantly ﬂuent, discrepantly disﬂuent, or neutral. After every
sequence participants answered how ﬂuently they perceived the task to
be going. We hypothesized that discrepantly ﬂuent sequences lead to
higher feelings of ﬂuency than discrepantly disﬂuent sequences. Finally,
we wanted to explore whether the emergence of objective ﬂuency ef-
fects could also be modulated by the task context, such that it is most
pronounced during discrepantly ﬂuent sequences and least pronounced
during discrepantly disﬂuent sequences.
2.2.1 Method
Participants
Fifty-two university students (41 female) participated in the experiment
for a small monetary reward or course credit. The data of four partici-
pants were excluded from the analyses because their error rates on the
aﬀordance task exceeded 20%.
Design and procedure
Participants always responded to a series of twelve trials of the aﬀor-
dance task, which was introduced as a reaction time task, and then
answered the question To what extent do you think that the reaction
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time task is going ﬂuently? by typing in the number corresponding to
their answer on a vertically displayed scale from 1 = not at all ﬂuent to
6 = very ﬂuent. After a blank of 500 ms, they received the instruction
that the reaction time task would now continue, which remained on the
screen for 3500 ms. Then the next aﬀordance task series started. Within
these series, each object was presented until an answer was made or 3000
ms had elapsed. If no answer or an incorrect answer was made, partici-
pants heard a short warning signal. Then the next object appeared.
We manipulated the sequences within the twelve aﬀordance task tri-
als. In ﬂuent sequences, the ﬁrst four trials and the seventh and eighth
trial required S-R incompatible responses, while the ﬁfth and sixth trial
and the last four trials of the sequence required S-R compatible re-
sponses. In disﬂuent sequences this pattern was reversed, such that
the sequence started with S-R compatible responses and ended with in-
compatible responses. Finally, in the control sequences, the order was
completely randomized per participant and per sequence. Importantly,
within each type of sequence, there was an equal number of S-R com-
patible and incompatible responses. Furthermore, whether participants
had to respond with their left or right hand was counterbalanced with
the type of trial within each sequence, such that each sequence required
six upright and six inverted judgments, i.e., six left-hand and six
right-hand responses, three of each were congruent and three of which
were incongruent with the object's orientation.
Additionally, we manipulated the response mapping within-partici-
pants across two experimental blocks, i.e., whether participants made
the upright judgment with their left hand and the inverted judgment
with their right hand or vice versa. Within each mapping, participants
saw ﬁve ﬂuent, ﬁve disﬂuent, and ﬁve control sequences, thus a total
of 2 (mapping) × 15 sequences × 12 trials per sequence = 380 trials of
the aﬀordance task, interrupted with 30 ﬂuency questions. The order
in which participants saw the objects was randomized per participant
and the order in which participants did the two mapping blocks was
counterbalanced. Participants did 20 practice trials of the aﬀordance
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Response Object M(SD)
Hand Orientation RT ACC
N
right hand rightward 591.49 (60.36) .93 (.05) 48
leftward 603.64 (61.28) .93 (.05) 48
left hand rightward 609.63 (58.66) .92 (.05) 48
leftward 603.64 (61.28) .92 (.05) 48
Table 2.1: Mean response times (RT, Milliseconds) and accuracy rates (ACC, per-
centage) as a function of response hand and object orientation during
the aﬀordance task in experiment 2
task (ten congruent, ten incongruent) before each mapping block. In
order to get participants used to the task, the congruent and incongruent
trials were each presented in a row and we counterbalanced which came
ﬁrst between participants.
2.2.2 Results
Response times and accuracy during the aﬀordance task
We removed all erroneous trials and reaction times more than 2 SDs
from the respective condition mean. We then computed a 3 (sequence:
ﬂuent vs. disﬂuent vs. control) × 2 (mapping: left-hand: upright vs.
right-hand: upright) × 2 (response: left-hand vs. right-hand) × 2 (ori-
entation: leftward vs. rightward) repeated measures ANOVA across the
reaction times of all aﬀordance task trials. We found the predicted in-
teraction between response and orientation, F (1, 47) = 15.99, p < .001,
η2p = .25.
2 As the means in Table 2.1 illustrate, participants responded
faster, when the orientation of the object matched the side of the re-
2The analysis further revealed a main eﬀect of mapping, F (1, 47) = 25.44, p <
.001, η2p = .35: Participants made faster responses when they made the upright-
judgment with their right hand and the inverted-judgment with their left hand (M =
581.91, SD = 64.79) than vice versa (M = 610.30, SD = 57.21) and a main eﬀect
of response, F (1, 47) = 58.98, p < .001, η2p = .56: Participants responded faster with
their right hand (M = 585.02, SD = 58.92) than with their left hand (M = 606.61,
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quired response. Interestingly, this interaction was further qualiﬁed by a
three-way interaction between the ﬂuency sequence, response, and ori-
entation, F (2, 94) = 5.37, p = .006, η2p = .10. As planned contrast
analyses revealed, the expected aﬀordance eﬀect was most pronounced
for ﬂuent sequences, F (1, 47) = 23.97, p < .001, η2p = .34, weaker for
control sequences, F (1, 47) = 4.17, p = .048, η2p = .08, and it disap-
peared for disﬂuent sequences, F (1, 47) < 1. Figure 2.2 illustrates this
interaction.
An analogue 3 (sequence: ﬂuent vs. disﬂuent vs. control) × 2
(mapping: left-hand: upright vs. right-hand: upright) × 2 (response:
left-hand vs. right-hand) × 2 (orientation: leftward vs. rightward)
repeated measures ANOVA on the participants' accuracy rate during the
task only yielded a main eﬀect of mapping, F (1, 47) = 6.05, p = .018,
η2p = .11, indicating that participants were more accurate when making
the upright response with their right hand and the inverted response
with their left hand (M = .93, SD = .04) than vice versa (M = .92,
SD = .05). Thus, we can rule out a speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ.
Perceived ﬂuency
We hypothesized that the discrepantly ﬂuent sequences would be experi-
enced as more ﬂuent than discrepantly disﬂuent sequences. We assessed
this in a repeated measures ANOVA. Since participants might have
derived the feeling of ﬂuency from performing accurately rather than
from the compatibility between the stimuli and their motor response,
we controlled for accuracy in the analysis. It yielded the expected main
eﬀect of perceived ﬂuency, F (2, 92) = 4.29, p = .016, η2p = .09: Par-
ticipants perceived the aﬀordance task as most ﬂuent after ﬂuent se-
quences (M = 4.47, SD = 0.81) and about equally ﬂuent after disﬂuent
SD = 58.70). Furthermore, interactions between mapping and response, F (1, 47) =
17.95, p < .001, η2p = .28 and between ﬂuency and response, F (2, 94) = 5.17, p =
.007, η2p = .10 emerged. As these eﬀects are not relevant to our hypotheses we will
not discuss them further.
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(M = 4.39, SD = 0.87) and control blocks (M = 4.38, SD = 0.88).
Planned contrasts indicated a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between ﬂuent and
disﬂuent sequences, F (1, 46) = 6.31, p = .016, η2p = .12, and between
ﬂuent and control sequences, F (1, 46) = 6.80, p = .012, η2p = .13. The
diﬀerence between disﬂuent and control sequences was not signiﬁcant,
F (1, 46) < 1.
Furthermore, there was a main eﬀect of participants' overall accuracy
on the aﬀordance task, F (1, 46) = 10.50, p = .002, η2p = .19: The
more accurate participants were the more they perceived the task as
ﬂuent. More interestingly, this was qualiﬁed by an interaction between
participants' accuracy and the ﬂuency sequences, F (2, 92) = 4.09, p =
.020, η2p = .08: For any kind of sequence, the more accurate participants
were, the more they thought the task went ﬂuently. However, this was
most pronounced for disﬂuent, t(45) = 3.36, p = .002, η2p = .20, B =
9.21, and control sequences, t(45) = 3.63, p = .001, η2p = .22, B = 9.88,
whereas accuracy played a smaller role for ﬂuent sequences, t(45) = 2.23,
p = .031, η2p = .10, B = 5.95.
2.2.3 Discussion
Performing actions in congruence with perceived action aﬀordances lead
to faster reaction times, i.e., an objective processing ﬂuency, and to the
experience of a feeling of ﬂuency  when the experienced ﬂuency de-
viated from the expected task contingencies. This is in line with our
hypothesis that visuo-motor ﬂuency eﬀects can arise from the compati-
bility between perceived action possibilities and motor responses. As in
previous research on the aﬀordance eﬀect, participants responded faster
when the required response hand and the object's orientation were con-
gruent than when they were not. Interestingly, this was qualiﬁed by the
ﬂuency context in which the trials appeared. When the task was dis-
crepantly ﬂuent, the aﬀordance eﬀect was enhanced compared to control
sequences, whereas it was diminished when the task was discrepantly
disﬂuent. This ﬁnding suggests that even objective ﬂuency eﬀects on
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a low processing level might be modulated by the task context. As
hypothesized, this was mirrored in participants' self-reported feelings
of ﬂuency. Furthermore, the interaction between the ﬂuency sequences
and participants' accuracy on the task in predicting feelings of ﬂuency
suggests that individuals use several sources to derive and report their
experience of ﬂuency. If participants experience visuo-motor disﬂuency,
they base the perceived ﬂuency judgment primarily on their accuracy.
If they perceive visuo-motor ﬂuency, they base this judgment signiﬁ-
cantly less on accuracy. In other words, the experience of visuo-motor
ﬂuency can override  or at least attenuate  the to be expected eﬀect
of accuracy on perceived ﬂuency.
2.3 General Discussion
In two experiments we demonstrated that the congruence of percep-
tual features of an object, as the orientation of its handle, and a motor
response made toward the object lead to visuo-motor ﬂuency. Specif-
ically, we showed that such congruence can give rise to objective ﬂu-
ency, to a subjective feeling of ﬂuency, and to a more positive feeling
state compared to incongruence. In Experiment 1 participants judged
the meaning of Chinese ideographs as more positive after discrepantly
ﬂuent aﬀordance task sequences than after discrepantly disﬂuent se-
quences. These results mirror the ﬂuency eﬀects of other processing
variables that don't involve the motor system on aﬀective responses (cf.
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Reber et al., 1998; Winkielman & Ca-
cioppo, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2002, 2003) and are in line with recent
research showing an association between ﬂuent movements and posi-
tive stimulus evaluations (A. E. Hayes et al., 2008) and positive aﬀect
(Cannon et al., 2010). To demonstrate that these aﬀective consequences
are indeed the result of a ﬂuency experience, we assessed participants'
feeling of ﬂuency more directly in Experiment 2. Our ﬁndings indicate
that individuals are aware of the processing dynamics that arise from
the interaction between perceiving aﬀordances and acting on them and
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as a result experience subjective ﬂuency: Participants reported that the
task was going more ﬂuently after discrepantly ﬂuent trials than after
discrepantly disﬂuent trials. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst direct
evidence that visuo-motor congruence indeed leads to a meta-cognitive
feeling of ﬂuency.
In Experiment 2 we further replicated the expected objective ﬂuency
eﬀect: As in previous research (Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004; Symes
et al., 2007) participants showed an actual processing advantage when
perceptual features of the stimulus were compatible with the required
motor response. Moreover, we showed that this processing advantage
can be qualiﬁed by the immediate task context: It was evident only
when the aﬀordance task became easier because a series of compatible
trials followed a series of incompatible trials or when it remained on an
equal diﬃculty level, but the eﬀect was attenuated when the task became
increasingly diﬃcult because a series of incompatible trials followed a
series of compatible trials. The idea that the task context or (implicit)
task expectations can modulate such low-level visuo-motor processing
eﬀects is intriguing and raises the novel question to what extent higher-
order cognitive functions can generally inﬂuence visuo-motor processes
that are assumed to be automatic as the potentiation of grasp types or
possible action components (cf. Tucker & Ellis, 1998).
Overall, our data thus support theories assuming a direct coupling
between perception and action (Hommel et al., 2001; Prinz, 1997;
E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004): Perception serves action by preparing
possible and likely behaviors. The aﬀordance eﬀect holds that when
seeing an object, we automatically think about how we could interact
with it. Our results show that when we then act in congruence with such
aﬀordances, this is not only easier and faster, but we also experience ﬂu-
ency and feel better. According to the hedonic marking hypothesis of
ﬂuency (Winkielman et al., 2003), such experiences can be useful in
that they allow us to monitor and evaluate our current processing dy-
namics, rewarding easy-to-process information that facilitates cognitive
processes. In sum, the present experiments are evidence for the hy-
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pothesis that ﬂuency can arise from the interaction between perception
and the motor system and that such ﬂuency eﬀects manifest themselves
on the processing level, as a subjective ﬂuency experience, and in the
aﬀective system.
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Sensible Moves
Abstract
In two experiments we hypothesized and showed that the sit-
uated constellation of bodily position and physical features
of the environment create aﬀordances that inﬂuence prefer-
ence judgments. Participants imagined that they were to
play table-tennis and had to pick a side. Participants playing
with their right hand preferred the right side, whereas par-
ticipants playing with their left hand preferred the left side.
This occurred for participants' natural handedness (Experi-
ment 1) and for a manipulation of the play-hand (Experiment
2). Our ﬁndings suggest that a) people use physical cues to
make preference judgments, b) these cues diﬀer as individuals
diﬀer in their physical makeup, and c) they are situated and
emerge within the dynamics between the individual and the
environment.
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Imagine standing in a supermarket to buy the pasta for dinner. Will
you prefer brand A or brand B? Will you be inﬂuenced by the fact that
brand A is to your left on the shelf and brand B is to your right? And
does it matter whether you are right- or left-handed? In the follow-
ing, we argue with aﬀordance theory (Gibson, 1979) that such spatial
features shape our actions and preferences.
We deﬁne the aﬀordance structure of a situation as the way our body
morphology interacts with the physical constraints of the environment
to determine the range of possible and likely actions (e.g., Gibson, 1979;
Glenberg, 1997; Stoﬀregen, 2003). Consequently, because cognition is
for action (Clark, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001; E. R. Smith & Semin,
2004), the meaning and the interpretation of a situation emerge from
the situated constellation of the physical constraints of the environment
and of one's own body. An obvious corollary from this assumption is
that the aﬀordances derived from a particular situation will depend on
personal, physical characteristics, for example, being tall or short or
being right- or left-handed. Whereas previous research has primarily in-
vestigated the immediate processing advantage that results from acting
in line with such aﬀordances (cf. Tucker & Ellis, 1998), we aim to show
that the perception of action aﬀordances also inﬂuences an individual's
preferences, such that the most aﬀorded, namely the least costly, course
of action is preferred. We thus contribute to the existing research by
demonstrating 1) the role of action aﬀordances for making a preference
choice and 2) the situatedness of this eﬀect, namely that aﬀordances
arise from situational action capabilities.
An increasing amount of research suggests that when perceiving an
object, we automatically think about our possibilities of interacting with
this object. For instance, in an experiment (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998),
participants had to make judgments about whether graspable objects
(e.g., a frying pan) were upright or inverted. To indicate their choice
they had to use their right or their left hand to press a key. In addition
to the invertedness dimension, the objects were displayed with a left- or
rightward orientation. Responses were faster when they were made with
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the hand for which it would be easier to grasp an object, even though this
was actually irrelevant to the judgment. Experiments on language com-
prehension provide additional evidence: Individuals don't even need to
see an object to think about corresponding actions (Borghi, Glenberg,
& Kaschak, 2004; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Kaschak & Glenberg,
2000; Tucker & Ellis, 2004; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). Overall, there is
considerable evidence showing that upon the perception of a target ob-
ject relevant actions are immediately potentiated. This is in line with
the premise that cognition serves an adaptive function. Perception then
needs to relate body and goals to the opportunities and costs of acting in
the environment (Proﬃtt, 2006, p. 110). The fact that  upon entering
a situation  the most aﬀorded (i.e., least costly) actions are immedi-
ately potentiated should thus induce a preference for these actions over
their less aﬀorded alternatives. Therefore, we hypothesize that when
individuals need to choose between two similar or seemingly equal al-
ternatives, the emergence of an aﬀordance structure will inﬂuence their
preferences and the most aﬀorded alternative is preferred.
Initial evidence suggests that preference judgments can be grounded
in the motor system (Beilock & Holt, 2007; Bergh et al., 1990): Skilled
typists repeatedly chose one of two letter dyads. The dyads were ma-
nipulated, such that typists would usually type the two letters with the
same hand (e.g., FV) or with diﬀerent hands (e.g., FJ). Skilled typists
preferred diﬀerent-hand letter dyads over same-hand letter dyads. The
authors proposed that perceiving the letter dyads triggered the sensori-
motor simulation of typing them. Simulating diﬀerent-hand dyads was
more aﬀorded than simulating same-hand dyads, because the associ-
ated action of typing dyads with diﬀerent hands is easier than typing
dyads with the same hand. Moreover, the mere anticipation of motor
ﬂuency can drive preferences: Participants were asked to move one of
two objects: the one they liked, disliked, or without an explicit instruc-
tion (neutral condition). The experimenters manipulated whether the
objects were easy or diﬃcult to grasp. In the neutral and like condi-
tions, participants preferred the easy-to-grasp objects, whereas in the
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dislike condition, participants had no clear preference (Ping, Dhillon, &
Beilock, 2009).
If such preferences are truly embodied, aﬀordance-based, and arise
as the result of one's physical constraints in a situation, we propose that
diﬀerences in a person's physical makeup should lead to systematically
diﬀerent preferences. Warren suggested that an individual's perception
reﬂects his or her capabilities (1984). In his experiments, participants
reported the height of stairs they could maximally climb or would pre-
fer to climb. He found that what participants perceived as critical and
preferred depended on their own leg length. Thus, participants took the
dynamics between their bodies and the situation into account in their
preference judgments. Similarly, Longo and Lourenco (2007) showed
that participants' perception of near space is construed as a function
of their arm length. The physical diﬀerences between participants have
also been experimentally manipulated, for example by allowing for tool
use. Witt, Proﬃtt, and Epstein (2005) manipulated whether partici-
pants reached for an object with their hands or with a baton and then
assessed participants' perceived distance to the object. Participants
thought the object was closer when it was easier to interact with (i.e.,
when reaching with a baton). In another experiment (Mark, 1987),
participants made judgments about whether surfaces would aﬀord sit-
ting or climbing on. When wearing 10 cm high blocks under their feet,
participants quickly adjusted their judgments to incorporate the addi-
tional 10 cm into their assessments of action capabilities. The perceived
aﬀordance structure thus changed as their bodily features changed.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that bodily diﬀerences and capabil-
ities give rise to diﬀerent perceptions of the same situation, namely to
diﬀerent action aﬀordances. Indeed, in the above cited experiments with
typists, the preference for the more aﬀorded letter dyads only occurred
for skilled typists, whereas novice typists showed no preference (Beilock
& Holt, 2007). Thus, only when participants associated the dyads with
meaningful motor patterns did the preference occur.
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In the current experiments, we operationalized bodily diﬀerences
with regard to the hand with which participants have to act. Most
individuals have a clear preference for performing actions such as writ-
ing, pouring water into a glass, or playing table-tennis with their dom-
inant hand. If the perception of a situation is action-based, as we pro-
pose, left- and right-handers should derive diﬀerent aﬀordances from the
same situation. Moreover, when given a choice between an object that
better aﬀords a right-hand action vs. an object that better aﬀords a
left-hand action, such as reaching for a particular bag of pasta at the
supermarket, an individual's preference should be driven by these af-
fordances. Casasanto (2009) has introduced a similar argument as the
body-speciﬁcity hypothesis: Assuming that mental representations are
grounded in the motor system (cf. Barsalou, 1999; Prinz, 1997), individ-
uals who diﬀer in their physical make-up, for instance because they are
right- vs. left-handed, should have diﬀerent representations of manual
actions. Indeed, in a series of experiments he showed that individuals
associate positive valence with the side of their dominant hand, namely
the side with which they can act more ﬂuently. Willems, Hagoort, and
Casasanto (2010) further demonstrated that for left- and right-handed
individuals reading manual action verbs is associated with neural activ-
ity on the hemisphere that is respectively contralateral to their dominant
hands.
In the current experiments, we extend the existing research in two
ways. First, whereas previous research on the body-speciﬁcity hypothe-
sis has focused on the general diﬀerence between right- and left-handers
(Casasanto, 2009; R. M. Willems et al., 2010), we investigate the sit-
uatedness of this eﬀect. For example, a right-handed individual might
prefer the pasta on the right-hand shelf whereas a left-handed individ-
ual might prefer the pasta on the left, simply because it is more read-
ily reachable. However, we propose that action aﬀordances emerge as
the product of situational constraints and one's own action capabilities:
A right-handed individual who is holding tomatoes, cheese, and other
sauce ingredients in her right hand, is likely to prefer the pasta on the
left, as the situated constraints better aﬀord a left-hand grasp. Second,
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we extend the work on action aﬀordances to the realm of choice pref-
erences. Whereas previous research has shown that ﬂuent interactions
with objects lead to higher liking ratings for these objects (A. E. Hayes
et al., 2008) and to positive aﬀect (Cannon et al., 2010), we propose
that the mere anticipation of such an interaction is suﬃcient to drive
people's preferences toward the most aﬀorded alternative.
In sum, we hypothesized that the perception of action aﬀordances
in a situation will drive an individual's preferences, such that the least
costly action is preferred. Furthermore, in Experiment 1 we tested the
hypothesis that action aﬀordances are body-speciﬁc, namely those indi-
viduals with diﬀerent action capabilities, such as being right- vs. left-
handed, will form systematically diﬀerent preferences. In Experiment
2, we investigated the situatedness of this eﬀect, as we hypothesized
that such action aﬀordances are an emergent property of an individual's
general physical capabilities and the constraints of the situation.
3.1 Experiment 1: Handedness
We operationalized participants' preferences as the choice between play-
ing on the left vs. right side of a table-tennis table. Participants had to
imagine that they were going to play table-tennis. They saw a drawing
of a table-tennis table and had to pick a side to play on. We assumed
that participants would simulate the situation in an embodied manner.
This simulation should lead to an automatic potentiation of the most
aﬀorded action alternative. We expected that what is perceived as the
most aﬀorded action alternative would diﬀer as a function of the partici-
pant's handedness: For a right-handed person, the more aﬀorded course
of action should be to pick the right side of the table, as one can nearly
reach that side by extending one's arm whereas moving to the left side of
the table requires a slightly more complicated action. For a left-handed
person, the reverse should be true, such that the more aﬀorded course
of action should be to pick the left side of the table.
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Figure 3.1: Stimulus material from experiments 1 and 2. Participants indicated on
which side they preferred to play by clicking on one of the two avatars
(Experiment 1) or by pressing a corresponding key (Experiment 2).
3.1.1 Method
Participants
Fourty-two students participated in this study, but two were removed
before the analyses, because they reported being ambidextrous. The
ﬁnal sample included 26 (self-reported) right-handed and 14 left-han-
ded participants. Participants' handedness was assessed in an unrelated
experiment.
Procedure
Participants imagined that they were to play table-tennis with their best
friend and that they got to choose the side of the table to play at. Then
were they asked: On which side of the table-tennis table would you
prefer to play? Below the instructions we provided a schematic picture
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of a table-tennis table. It was horizontally centered on the screen and
viewed perpendicular to the long side of the table, in continuation of
the net (see Figure 3.1). To the left and to the right of the table were
identical stick-ﬁgures. Participants indicated where they preferred to
play by clicking on one of the two ﬁgures.
3.1.2 Results and Discussion
The hypothesis that right-handed participants would prefer the right
side of the table was supported in a binomial test (18 right side vs. 8
left side), p < .05 , as was the hypothesis that left-handed participants
would prefer the left side of the table (13 left side vs. 1 right side),
p < .001. Overall, we expected the proportion of choices for the right
side to be larger for right-handed than for left-handed individuals. A
Fisher's exact test conﬁrmed that this diﬀerence in proportions between
left- and right-handers was signiﬁcant, p < .001, with an odds ratio of
26.65 (95% C.I.[3.09 − 1299.15]). The likelihood of choosing the right
side of the table was thus more than 26 times higher for right-handed
participants than for left-handed participants. This strongly supports
our hypothesis: To make a preference judgment about which side to play
at, participants used the aﬀordance structure of the situation, which
emerged as a function of the physical constraints of the situation and
their own bodies.
However, an alternative explanation is conceivable: Perhaps partic-
ipants didn't derive their preference from the aﬀordance structure, but
have a general preference for the side of their dominant hand. Casasanto
(2009), for example, showed that individuals associate the side of their
dominant hand with positivity and the side of their non-dominant hand
with negativity. Thus, participants might simply have learned this asso-
ciation, leading them to generally prefer the side of their dominant hand
 irrespective of the situational aﬀordance structure. On the contrary,
we propose that an aﬀordance structure is malleable and emerges in a
situated manner (E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004). Thus, when there are no
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other constraints, using the dominant hand is most aﬀorded. However,
when the dominant hand is blocked, because one is holding the pasta
sauce ingredients, grabbing the bag of pasta with the non-dominant
hand becomes the most aﬀorded action. Similarly, instructing partic-
ipants to play table-tennis with their non-dominant hand should also
change their preference towards that side of the table-tennis table. In
sum, we predict this to be the case because we assume that participants'
preference choices are based on the aﬀordance structure. If participants
had a general preference for the side of their dominant hand, we should
ﬁnd a right-side preference for right-handed individuals, irrespective of
whether they are going to play with their right hand or with their left
hand.
3.2 Experiment 2: Situational Constraints
To address the question whether participants in Experiment 1 based
their preferences on the perceived aﬀordances, we experimentally ma-
nipulated the aﬀordance structure in Experiment 2. We argued that
bodily diﬀerences lead to the emergence of diﬀerent aﬀordances and
that this happens in a situated manner. Thus, aﬀordances arise as the
result of the physical constraints in a speciﬁc situation. In many cases,
these will coincide with previously established capabilities or habits: A
right-handed individual will more likely use the right hand to put the key
into the lock. However, when the default action isn't available because
the situation imposes additional constraints, the aﬀordance structure
changes accordingly. Therefore, in this experiment, we used the same
paradigm as in Experiment 1, but participants had to imagine playing
with their dominant hand or their non-dominant hand.
Additionally, in Experiment 1, participants saw a drawing of the
table-tennis table, but did not receive instructions about where to imag-
ine themselves in the scene. To control for this, we included two posi-
tion conditions in Experiment 2: a no-position-instruction condition to
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replicate Experiment 1 and an explicit-position-instruction condition in
which we told participants where to imagine themselves.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Eighty-one students participated in the experiment and were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions in the 2 (dominant vs. non-
dominant hand) x 2 (position instruction) design. We excluded ﬁve
participants from the analyses, because they failed to report the correct
play-hand after the experiment. Also, since we manipulated the aﬀor-
dance structure by instructing participants to play with their dominant
or non-dominant hand, we only included the data of right-handed par-
ticipants, excluding three left-handed participants.1 The ﬁnal sample
included 73 participants (36 in the dominant hand condition).
Procedure
The table-tennis task was identical to Experiment 1 with three excep-
tions. First, participants were told that they and their friend were doing
a skillfulness task and that they would play with their dominant (vs.
non-dominant) hand. Participants' attention therefore wasn't explicitly
directed at the right or left, but the play-hand instruction was disguised
as a skillfulness task. We gave them a table-tennis racket to hold in their
assigned play hand. Second, we controlled the position where partici-
pants imagined themselves in the scene. In the no-position-instruction
1Although for logical reasons we only report the results for right-handed partici-
pants, the results remain the same when including the three left-handed participants.
We would also expect this, as we assume the preferences to derive from the emerging
aﬀordance structure. Since we impose a play-hand, the preference choice should no
longer diﬀer between right- and left-handed individuals.
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Choice for
Play-hand Position-Instruction
left side right side
Total
Right hand No instruction 5 12 17
Explicit instruction 5 14 19
Total 10 26 36
Left hand No instruction 13 5 18
Explicit instruction 11 8 19
Total 24 13 37
Table 3.1: Frequencies of choosing the left vs. right side of the table-tennis table
as a function of participants' play-hand and the position instruction in
experiment 2
condition, participants saw the same drawing as in Experiment 1 with-
out further instructions. In the explicit-position-instruction condition,
the drawing contained an avatar symbolizing the participant's position
in front of the table-tennis table, facing the net, centered between the
two sides. Third, participants indicated their preference for the side of
the table-tennis table by pressing one of two neighboring keys on the
keyboard instead of using the mouse since they held a racket in one
hand. After participants had chosen a side, we assessed their actual
handedness.
3.2.2 Results and Discussion
Participants imagined using their dominant or non-dominant hand. As
we limit the analyses to right-handed participants, this is equivalent to
playing with the right vs. left hand. We submitted the participants'
choice for the side of the table-tennis table to a 2 (play-hand) × 2
(position instruction) logistic regression analysis. As expected, a main
eﬀect of the hand condition emerged, Wald X 2 = 5.98, p < .05, with
an odds ratio of Exp(B) = 6.24 (95% C.I.[1.44 − 27.06]). There was
no main or interaction eﬀect of the position-instruction condition. For
the subsequent analyses, we thus combined the two instruction condi-
tions. Binomial tests revealed that participants playing with their right
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hand were more likely to choose the right side of the table than the left,
p < .01, and that participants playing with their left hand were more
likely to choose the left side of the table than the right, p < .05. All
frequencies are displayed in Table 3.1. Overall, participants' preference
choice diﬀered as a function of their play-hand. This eﬀect was sym-
metrical and occurred for participants imagining to play with their right
hand and with their left hand.
3.3 General Discussion
Two experiments showed that individuals use the aﬀordance structure of
a situation to derive preferences. Experiment 1 demonstrated that peo-
ple use cues from their bodies and that these cues diﬀer as a function of
bodily diﬀerences: Left- and right-handers had systematically diﬀerent
preferences for playing at the left vs. at the right side of a table-tennis
table respectively. Experiment 2 revealed that this eﬀect depended on a
situated construal of the aﬀordance structure: The preference of right-
handers changed toward the left side when they imagined playing with
their left hand compared to their right hand.
We argue that the physical aﬀordances an actor derives from a sit-
uation are a situated, emergent property of the dynamics between the
actor and the environment, which lead to an action-driven perception
of the situation. This is consistent with theories of embodied cognition
(cf. Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997). Our results show that this link
between perception and action possibilities not only results in a process-
ing advantage of aﬀorded actions (e.g., Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2004), but
it can also drive people's preferences towards the most aﬀorded alterna-
tive.
It is noteworthy that participants in our experiments made a choice
about which side of the table-tennis table they wanted to play on  not
where they preferred to go. Since both sides were actually equally likely
49
Sensible Moves
and participants were explicitly instructed to think about where to play,
we propose that the mere anticipation of how easily they could move
toward either side of the table was suﬃcient to inﬂuence their prefer-
ences. Although our experiments do not address this mediating process
directly, we suggest that our results are driven by the perceived ﬂuency
that the participants anticipate for each course of action. Indeed, in a
recent set of experiments, we showed that acting in line with perceived
aﬀordances triggers positive aﬀect and a feeling of processing ﬂuency
(Regenberg, Häfner, & Semin, in press). This corroborates research by
Hayes et al. (2008), in which participants grasped objects and moved
them around. This movement was manipulated to be either ﬂuent or
involved avoiding an obstacle and was therefore disﬂuent. Participants
then rated how much they liked the object compared to other objects of
its kind. As expected, participants liked the objects more after a ﬂuent
movement than after a disﬂuent movement. This suggests that ﬂuent
interactions lead to more preferable evaluations. Our current ﬁndings
add to this by demonstrating that the mere anticipation of such an
interaction (Should I go to the left or to the right?) is enough to
drive people's preferences. Similarly, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) already
showed a position eﬀect on the evaluation of consumer products. In an
array of identical stockings, the right-most stocking was often preferred.
The current work might oﬀer an aﬀordance-based account of this eﬀect.
Assuming that almost 90% of a normal population is right-handed (cf.
Gilbert & Wysocki, 1992), the position bias could indicate that partici-
pants chose the stocking that they could most easily interact with, the
one on their dominant side.
Our results furthermore support the body-speciﬁcity hypothesis
(Casasanto, 2009). Experiment 1 shows that preference judgments are
body-speciﬁc. Participants prefer the aﬀordance-based ﬂuency over less
ﬂuent actions. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that the proposed
body-speciﬁcity is malleable and situation-dependent. Therefore, we
propose that the experience of motor ﬂuency and its eﬀects on prefer-
ence choices and evaluations (cf. A. E. Hayes et al., 2008) is an emergent
phenomenon. Individuals can easily adapt their capabilities to tools or
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other changes in their bodily capabilities (Longo & Lourenco, 2007;
Witt et al., 2005; Warren, 1984). Overall, our ﬁndings encourage the
use of an embodied, situated approach to cognition, where the individ-
ual is treated as an actor in a dynamic system of him- or herself and the
environment.
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Regenberg, N.F.E., Häfner, M., & Semin, G.R. (2010). Getting in touch with your
senses: The costs and beneﬁts of multimodal processing. Manuscript in preparation.
Sensible Moves
Abstract
According to the theory of perceptual symbol systems
(Barsalou, 1999), concept representations are modality-
speciﬁc and context-dependent. Previous research has shown
that therefore switching between modalities when processing
concept words incurs a cost. In the present research, we pro-
pose that encoding concepts within a multi-modality context
enriches their mental representation, such that it is easier
to derive the concept's meaning. In Experiment 1, we show
that despite the processing cost associated with modality-
switching, participants report more positive mood after pro-
cessing a multi-modality context than after a single-modality
context. Furthermore, concepts encoded with properties from
several modalities became more accessible and participants
liked them more than concepts encoded with properties from
a single modality (Experiment 2). Our ﬁndings are in line
with situated, embodied accounts of cognition, which assume
concept representations to be dynamic and provide experi-
mental evidence that this representational ﬂexibility can have
implications for an individual's processing experience per se.
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Think about an eggplant and whether it looks purple, dark, and
shiny. What kind of mental representation do you now have for the
concept EGGPLANT? Now think again about an eggplant and whether
it feels smooth, looks dark, and tastes bitter. Does this description evoke
a diﬀerent representation of the concept EGGPLANT than the ﬁrst de-
scription? Prior research from an embodied cognition perspective (cf.
Barsalou, 1999) suggests that conceptual representations are based on
sensorimotor simulations and that therefore processing concepts with
properties from diﬀerent sensory modalities, such as touch, vision, and
taste, incurs a cost compared to processing concepts with properties
from the same modality (Pecher et al., 2004). In the present experi-
ments, we explore the consequences of encoding concepts in a single-
modality context (e.g., visual) vs. in a multi-modality context (e.g.,
tactile, visual, and gustatory) for their representation. We propose that
although such concept-property pairs are initially more easily processed
in a single-modality context (Pecher et al., 2003, 2004), concepts en-
coded within a multi-modality context gain a richer semantic represen-
tation. We expect that such semantic richness makes concepts more
accessible and evokes a positive aﬀective response.
4.1 Modality-Speciﬁc Processing and Semantic
Richness
Semantic richness refers to the amount of information (the number of
features and associations) individuals generate when thinking about
the meaning of a concept (Pexman, Hargreaves, Edwards, Henry, &
Goodyear, 2007). Words with a rich semantic representation are more
readily accessible in the mind, that is, they are processed faster than
words with a poorer semantic representation. For example, the number-
of-features eﬀect holds that words associated with a high number of fea-
tures are responded to faster during lexical decisions (Grondin, Lupker,
& McRae, 2009; Pexman, Lupker, & Hino, 2002). Previous research has
typically treated semantic richness as a general trait of concept words
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by using word norms (cf. McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & McNorgan, 2005;
D. L. Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004) to create a controlled set of
stimuli which, for instance, vary only on the number-of-features dimen-
sion (e.g., Grondin et al., 2009; Kounios et al., 2009; Pexman et al.,
2002; Pexman, Holyk, & Monﬁls, 2003). In the current research, on
the other hand, we address the malleability of concept representations
and its consequences for one's processing experience. We employ a situ-
ated cognition approach (cf. E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004) to conceptual
thought assuming that cognition serves action and is hence dynamic and
situation-speciﬁc (Barsalou, 2003; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006; Zwaan et al.,
2004). Therefore, concept representations should be contingent on the
current processing context. Particularly, we propose that the seman-
tic richness of a concept's current representation is variable and can be
inﬂuenced by the context in which it is encountered.
The present work is based on recent theories suggesting that senso-
rimotor simulations underlie conceptual representations (e.g., Barsalou,
1999, 2008; Glenberg, 1997). According to the theory of perceptual
symbol systems (PSS, Barsalou, 1999), concepts are represented by
simulations of actual experiences with those concepts. Thus, for ex-
ample, thinking about the concept EGGPLANT could involve the neu-
ral systems for vision, touch, taste, and action to re-enact experiences
with an eggplant. Importantly, the theory assumes that such percep-
tual simulations are dynamic and context-dependent. Someone who is
about to cut and fry an eggplant is likely to have a diﬀerent represen-
tation of it than someone who is about to throw it to someone else.
An increasing amount of research supports the hypothesis that such dy-
namic, context-dependent simulations underlie conceptual thought (e.g.,
Barsalou, 1983; Zwaan, Stanﬁeld, & Yaxley, 2002; see Yeh & Barsa-
lou, 2006 for more examples). For instance, participants read sentences
about an object in diﬀerent locations, which implied a particular shape
of the object, such as an egg in a refrigerator vs. an egg in a skillet
(Zwaan et al., 2002). They then saw a line drawing of that object and
indicated whether or not it had been mentioned in the sentence. Partici-
pants' responses were facilitated when the object's shape in the drawing
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matched the shape implied by the preceding sentence supporting the
hypothesis that conceptual thought, including language comprehension,
involves perceptual symbols that are dynamically adapted to the current
context (see also Borghi et al., 2004; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan
et al., 2004).
Moreover, PSS theory proposes that conceptual representations are a
partial re-enactment of actual experiences and that therefore the result-
ing simulations are modality-speciﬁc. Thinking about whether an egg-
plant is purple will thus evoke a diﬀerent representation of the concept
EGGPLANT than thinking about whether it tastes bitter. Evidence for
the modality-speciﬁcity of simulations comes from experiments employ-
ing a property-veriﬁcation task. Participants veriﬁed whether a property
is typically true of a given concept (Pecher et al., 2003), e.g., the prop-
erty loud for the concept BLENDER. The preceding trial always involved
a diﬀerent concept-property pair with a property from the same sensory
modality (e.g., LEAVES-Rustling) or with a property from a diﬀerent
sensory modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart). Participants were faster
when the modality mentioned in the preceding sentence was the same
as in the current sentence. This ﬁnding suggests that language com-
prehension is modality-speciﬁc, such that switching from one modality
to another incurs a processing cost similar to that observed when pro-
cessing perceptual signals from diﬀerent modalities (Spence, Nicholls, &
Driver, 2000). In a similar paradigm, Pecher et al. (2004) presented con-
cept words twice with several intervening trials. They varied whether
the concept (e.g., APPLE) was paired with two properties from the
same modality (e.g., green, shiny) or with two properties from diﬀerent
modalities (e.g., tart, shiny) on the two occurrences. On the second
occurrence of each concept, participants responded faster and more ac-
curately when the properties came from the same modality than when
they came from diﬀerent modalities. This happened even after a lag
of several intervening trials, such that there seem to be concept-speciﬁc
long-term consequences driven by the componential and dynamic nature
of ongoing simulations.
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In other words, such contextualized simulations of the same concept
might not only diﬀer in the sensory modalities they involve, but they can
also vary in the extent to which diﬀerent sensory modalities are involved:
Thinking of an eggplant with the goal to throw it might involve mainly
tactile properties, whereas thinking about how to cut and fry an eggplant
might involve both tactile and gustatory properties. We propose that
the contextualized, modality-speciﬁc mechanism underlying conceptual
thought fundamentally aﬀects the current representation of a concept,
above and beyond the demonstrated processing advantage for properties
from the same modality (Pecher et al., 2003, 2004; Van Dantzig et al.,
2008; Vermeulen, Corneille, & Niedenthal, 2008). Whereas the immedi-
ate processing might be more costly when one needs to switch between
modalities, the activation of several sensory modalities when processing
a particular concept  as compared to just one modality  and thus the
association of multi-modality properties with that concept may lead to
a richer semantic representation. A concept may become more easily
imaginable (i.e., more accessible) the more modalities are involved in
its representation. In other words, the more modalities are involved in
a concept's representation the more accessible its meaning should be-
come: In real-life, we often don't only have one sense to rely on, but
at the same time, we know how something looks, smells, and feels. In
line with this observation, a recent experimental ﬁnding implicates that
individuals recognize visual stimuli faster when they are accompanied
by a semantically-congruent sound (Chen & Spence, 2010).
In sum, we hypothesize that the more sensory modalities are involved
in the representation of a concept, the richer the concept's representation
becomes and thus the concept's meaning becomes more easily accessible.
Importantly, unlike previous research on semantic richness eﬀects (e.g.,
Grondin et al., 2009; Kounios et al., 2009; Pexman et al., 2002, 2003), we
assume that concept representations are not static, but that the current
representation of a concept is construed according to recent experiences
with it (cf. McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; E. R. Smith, 1996). Thus,
we predict that processing a concept within a multi-modality context
increases the semantic richness of its current representation as compared
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to processing it within a single-modality context even though the latter
representation might be created more easily (Pecher et al., 2003, 2004).
4.2 Representational Richness and Processing
Fluency
Ultimately, we propose that this representational richness inﬂuences an
individual's processing experience. Research on ﬂuency suggests that
representational richness facilitates the ease with which information can
be processed or retrieved (Gill et al., 1998). For example, increasing
the number of well-integrated facts associated with a concept increases
its retrieval ﬂuency, indicated by the speed with which that information
can be recalled (Myers et al., 1984; E. E. Smith et al., 1978). Moreover
Gill et al. (1998) demonstrated that representational richness not only
produces ﬂuency but that this in turn aﬀects the conﬁdence individuals
have in their judgments. The hedonic marking hypothesis of ﬂuency
(Winkielman et al., 2003) proposes that ﬂuency experiences are gener-
ally associated with positive aﬀect and enhance liking for the targets
of processing. For example, conceptual ﬂuency can increase evaluative
judgments (Whittlesea, 1993, Experiment 5): Participants liked target
words better when they were presented in a predictive semantic context
(e.g., The stormy seas tossed the BOAT.) than when they were pre-
sented in a non-predictive context (e.g., He saved up his money and
bought a BOAT.).
Therefore, we hypothesized that if processing concepts in a multi-
modality context increases the richness of their semantic representation
as compared to when they are processed in a context involving just one
sensory modality, then these concepts should become associated with a
positive aﬀective response. Speciﬁcally, we tested the hypotheses that
a multi-modality context leads to a richer semantic representation and
thus triggers implicit positive aﬀect and that concept words associated
with properties from diﬀerent modalities are more accessible and are
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evaluated more positively than concepts associated with properties from
one modality.
4.3 Overview of the Current Research
We propose that although switching between sensory modalities while
processing concept words produces a cost (Pecher et al., 2003, 2004),
such multi-modality processing increases the richness of the concept's
representations. As representational richness is known to increase ac-
cessibility (Grondin et al., 2009; Pexman et al., 2002) and to foster
processing ﬂuency (cf. Gill et al., 1998), we hypothesized that pro-
cessing concepts within a multi-modality context ultimately produces a
positive aﬀective response. Experiment 1 tested this hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, concepts associated with properties from diﬀerent modalities
should become more accessible than concepts associated with proper-
ties from one modality and should be evaluated more positively. We
addressed these hypotheses in Experiment 2. In both experiments, we
used a property-veriﬁcation task paradigm.
4.4 Experiment 1: Multi-Modality Contexts
Produce Positive Aﬀect
We assumed that processing concept words in a multi-modality context
increases representational richness as compared to processing concept
words in a single-modality context. In this experiment, we investigated
whether this results in the experience of positive aﬀect after processing
a multi-modality context as compared to processing a single-modality
context. We administered a property veriﬁcation task similar to that
used by Pecher et al. (2003), but presented the concept-property pairs in
sequences which were manipulated to involve a mix of diﬀerent modality-
properties or all properties came from the same modality. After each
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sequence, participants rated the pleasantness of a Chinese ideograph, a
measure known to capture implicit aﬀect (Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). We
expected to replicate the typical switching cost eﬀect on participants'
response latencies while processing the concept-property pairs: They
should be faster on single-modality sequences than on multi-modality
sequences. However, we hypothesized that despite these switching costs,
participants would experience more positive aﬀect after multi-modality
sequences as indicated by higher pleasantness ratings of the Chinese
ideographs as a result of the representational richness produced by the
multi-modality context.
4.4.1 Method
Participants
Seventy students participated in the experiment for a small monetary
reward or course credit. We excluded four participants before the anal-
yses, because they answered less than 70% of the property-veriﬁcation
trials correctly, and an additional two participants because Dutch (the
language the experiment was conducted in) was not their native lan-
guage.
Design
Participants always saw sequences of eight trials of the property-veriﬁ-
cation task and then judged the pleasantness of a Chinese ideograph. We
manipulated the property-veriﬁcation task sequences to form a multi-
modality context involving properties from four diﬀerent sensory modal-
ities: vision, audition, touch, and smell or taste or a single-modality
context in which all trials involved the same modality (vision, audition,
or touch). Participants did 24 such sequences, i.e., a total of 24 ideo-
graph evaluations and 192 property veriﬁcation task trials. They could
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take a break after twelve sequences (six multi- and six single-modality
sequences).
Materials
The stimulus set included 32 sentences of concept-property pairs, from
each of the three modalities vision, audition, and touch, e.g., A cave
is chilly. These sentences were partially taken from van Dantzig et
al. (2008) and amended by additional concept-property pairs from each
modality. Furthermore, in order to have sentences from four diﬀerent
modalities for the multi-modality sequences, we added concept-property
pairs from taste and smell. The properties from all sentences were paired
with new concepts to create an equal number of false ﬁller sentences.
We placed all sentences in two lists, such that the same properties (once
paired with a concept to form a TRUE sentence and once to form a
FALSE sentence) never appeared in the same experimental block (each
comprised of twelve such sequences after which participants could take
a break), except for some tactile properties because the tactile modality
has fewer property words than the other modalities (cf. Pecher et al.,
2003). The order in which participants saw these two stimulus lists
was counterbalanced across participants. The order of presentation and
whether a sentence appeared in a multi- or single-modality sequence was
randomized within each list and across participants. The materials can
be found in Appendix A.
Procedure
We told participants that they were participating in language research
and that they would do a reaction time task in which they had to ver-
ify properties for concrete object words. Furthermore, we told them
that they would sometimes have to do a diﬀerent task in between to
make the experiment more exciting: the pleasantness ratings of the Chi-
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nese ideographs. Participants always did a sequence of eight property
veriﬁcation task trials and then evaluated a Chinese ideograph. The
ideographs were randomly chosen without replacement from a pool of
ideographs. To familiarize participants with the task, they did four prac-
tice sequences at the beginning of the experiment with sentences and
concepts that did not reappear during the experiment, each followed by
a Chinese ideograph evaluation.
Within each sequence, four responses required a TRUE response
and four were FALSE. In single-modality sequences, all trials included
properties from one particular modality (vision, audition, or touch). In
multi-modality sequences, the four properties for the true trials came
from four diﬀerent modalities (vision, audition, touch, and smell or
taste) and the properties for the false trials came from the same four
modalities. Each property-veriﬁcation trial started with a warning sig-
nal (*****) presented for 500 ms at the center of the screen, then the
sentence appeared in the same position. It remained on the screen until
participants made a response (TRUE or FALSE) by pressing a button
with the left or right hand or until 3000 ms had elapsed. Whether
participants made the true response with the right or left hand was
counterbalanced across participants. Then the next sentence appeared.
After the eighth trial within each sequence, the warning signal consisted
of a blue square of asterisks, which was presented for 500 ms. Partici-
pants then knew to expect a Chinese ideograph, which appeared for 100
ms and was pattern masked for 100 ms. Next, participants were asked
how pleasant or unpleasant they thought the ideograph had looked on
a scale from 1-6. The scale was displayed vertically to avoid confusion
with the response hands and participants responded by typing in the
corresponding number. Participants then saw an instruction for 3000
ms to get ready again for the reaction time task, and after a blank of
500 ms, the next sequence of property veriﬁcation task trials began.
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4.4.2 Results
Response latencies and accuracy
We analyzed only sentences requiring a true response and only when
they were answered correctly. Furthermore, as commonly the case with
reaction times (Ratcliﬀ, 1993, see also Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), the
distribution was positively skewed. We therefore removed reaction times
that were faster than 300 ms or more than two standard deviations
above the respective condition mean and conducted a repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the condition the sentence appeared
in (multi- vs. single-modality context) to assess the typical switching
cost eﬀect. As expected, participants were faster on single-modality
trials (M = 1215.41, SD = 168.75) than on multi-modality trials (M =
1259.40, SD = 177.98), F (1, 63) = 28.67, p < .001, η2p = .31. A parallel
analysis of participants' accuracy rates yielded no eﬀect, F (1, 63) = 1.18,
p = .281, η2p = .02 (Msingle = .87, SD = .06; Mmulti = .87, SD = .05),
rendering a speed-accuracy trade-oﬀ unlikely (cf. Pecher et al., 2003).
Implicit aﬀect
We analyzed the pleasantness ratings of the Chinese ideographs in a
repeated measures ANOVA assessing the eﬀect of the type of sequence
(multi- vs. single-modality). As predicted, participants gave higher
pleasantness ratings after multi-modality sequences (M = 3.16, SD =
0.87) than after single-modality sequences (M = 3.05, SD = 0.86),
F (1, 63) = 4.68, p = .034, η2p = .07.
Although we did not ﬁnd an eﬀect of the modality-type on partici-
pants' accuracy during the property-veriﬁcation task, it is possible that
participants' perception of how accurately they were performing inﬂu-
enced these pleasantness ratings nevertheless. In order to control for
this possible confound, we used a multi-level approach for the repeated
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measures design to assess the eﬀect of the modality condition on the
ideograph evaluations, while controlling for participants' accuracy dur-
ing each sequence using the generalized linear equations module in SPSS
15. It supported the previous analysis and yielded the hypothesized ef-
fect of the modality condition, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 4.98, p = .026, but
no eﬀect of participants' accuracy, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 1.60, p = .205.
4.4.3 Discussion
In this experiment, we replicated the eﬀect that switching between
modalities when processing concept words incurs a cost (Pecher et al.,
2003). Moreover, we demonstrated that albeit this cost, participants'
gave higher pleasantness ratings for Chinese ideographs after multi-mo-
dality sequences than after single-modality sequences. We propose that
representational richness underlies this eﬀect because a multi-modality
context should foster a richer semantic representation than a single-
modality context. However, the design of this experiment does not allow
for any conclusions regarding the underlying mechanism. We addressed
this in the second experiment.
4.5 Experiment 2: Concept Accessibility and
Liking
In Experiment 2, we directly tested the hypothesis that concepts pro-
cessed with properties from diﬀerent modalities gain a richer semantic
representation than concepts processed with properties from one sin-
gle modality. Furthermore, we hypothesized that this representational
richness inﬂuences an individual's evaluation of a concept word. Partic-
ularly, we propose that concepts associated with properties from several
modalities are more accessible and are evaluated more positively than
concepts associated with properties from just one modality.
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We presented concept words repeatedly in a property veriﬁcation
task, always paired with a new property. We manipulated whether these
properties for one concept came from the same modality or from diﬀer-
ent modalities. This design is similar to that of Pecher et al. (2004),
who have demonstrated a switching cost eﬀect during processing: Re-
sponses to concept-property pairs involving the same modality as on
a previous occurrence of the concept were facilitated as compared to
concept-property pairs involving a modality that had not been presented
with this concept. However, we were interested in the consequences this
has for the representation of these concepts. Thus, after administering
the property veriﬁcation task, we assessed the accessibility of these con-
cepts with a lexical decision task. Subsequently, participants gave an
evaluation rating for each of the concept words. We hypothesized that
the semantic richness produced by processing concepts with properties
from diﬀerent modalities would increase their accessibility, as indicated
by faster recognition latencies on the lexical decision task, and partici-
pants' explicit evaluation of them.
Furthermore, we sought to explore the dynamics and limitations
of this eﬀect. In addition to the modality condition, we manipulated
whether each concept-property pair appeared once or four times dur-
ing the property veriﬁcation task. Repeated exposure to stimuli is
known to evoke a more positive evaluation (Zajonc, 1968, for a review
see Bornstein, 1989). Thus, this exposure condition serves as reference
to which to compare the increase we expect in the concept evaluations
for multi-modality concepts as compared to single-modality concepts: In
general, repeated exposure should lead to a more favorable evaluation of
the concept words. Thus, examining the eﬀect of the modality condition
on the concept evaluations against this exposure background provides
information about where the predicted eﬀect lies. We predicted that
the semantic richness associated with multi-modality concepts would
increase participants' evaluation of the concept words. Therefore, this
should become particularly visible in the single-exposure condition, be-
cause in the repeated-exposures condition the evaluations should gen-
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erally increase, which is likely to produce a ceiling eﬀect thereby elimi-
nating the advantage of multi-modality concepts.
In sum, we thus predicted that concepts that are paired with proper-
ties from diﬀerent modalities during the property veriﬁcation task gain
a richer semantic representation. Therefore, they should be more ac-
cessible during a lexical decision task and they should be evaluated
more positively. We expect this eﬀect to be modulated by the expo-
sure condition of the concepts, such that multi-modality concepts are
evaluated more positively than single-modality concepts in the single-
exposure condition, but that this diﬀerence is attenuated after repeated
exposures, because these should also elevate the evaluations of concepts
in the single-modality condition.
4.5.1 Method
Participants
Forty-seven students participated in the experiment. We excluded two
participants before the analyses, because Dutch (the language the exper-
iment was conducted in) was not their native language. Furthermore,
we omitted the data of ﬁve participants whose accuracy rate on the
property veriﬁcation task or the lexical decision task was below 70%.
Finally, we excluded three additional participants, because they did not
properly participate as they responded with the same value to all rat-
ing scales involved in the experiment. The ﬁnal sample thus included
thirty-seven participants.
Materials and design
All stimuli were concrete concept words. Each concept was paired with
three diﬀerent properties during the property veriﬁcation task. Depend-
67
Sensible Moves
M
o
d
a
lity
C
o
n
d
itio
n
sin
g
le
m
u
lti
3
co
n
cep
ts×
3
pro
p
erties
fro
m
3
co
n
cep
ts×
3
pro
p
erties
fro
m
sin
g
le
o
n
e
m
o
d
ality×
1
exp
o
su
re
d
iﬀ
eren
t
m
o
d
alities×
1
exp
o
su
re
E
xp
o
su
re
=
9
trials
=
9
trials
C
o
n
d
itio
n
3
co
n
cep
ts×
3
pro
p
erties
fro
m
3
co
n
cep
ts×
3
pro
p
erties
fro
m
rep
eated
1
m
o
d
ality×
4
exp
o
su
res
d
iﬀ
eren
t
m
o
d
alities×
4
exp
o
su
res
=
3
6
trials
=
3
6
trials
T
a
b
le
4
.1
:
D
esig
n
o
verview
o
f
exp
erim
en
t
2
68
4Getting in Touch With Your Senses
ing on the modality condition, these properties all came from the same
modality (e.g., EGGPLANT  purple, dark, shiny) or all came from dif-
ferent modalities (e.g., EGGPLANT  purple, smooth, eatable). Impor-
tantly, across participants, each concept appeared about equally often
in the same- and multi-modality condition. Furthermore, depending on
the exposure condition, these concept-property pairs were either pre-
sented once each or four times each during the property veriﬁcation
task. Within each cell of this 2 (modality condition) × 2 (repetition
condition) design, we presented three diﬀerent concepts, leading to a
total of 90 target trials (see Table 4.1 for design overview). These were
matched with 90 false ﬁller trials.
To select the concept-property pairs, we conducted pilot studies to
assess the pair's valence and the typicality of the property for the con-
cept. Both valence and typicality were assessed on a 6 point scale rang-
ing from -3 (negative / not typical) to +3 (positive / typical). Pairs
were only included if they had a positive typicality value (i.e., they were
seen as more typical than atypical) and if they were as neutral as pos-
sible with regards to valence (i.e., close to 0). The complete stimulus
materials are given in Appendix B.
We created twelve lists of stimulus combinations that fulﬁlled the
following criteria: First, the three concepts in the single-modality con-
ditions each involve a diﬀerent modality (e.g., EGGPLANT  three vi-
sual properties, DISH TOWL  three actions, LIGHT BULB  three
tactile properties). Second, the mean valence and typicality ratings do
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between the four conditions, ensuring that va-
lence and typicality were held constant within participants. Third, all
concepts appear about equally often in each condition across partici-
pants. Within these twelve combinations, the order of the stimuli was
pseudo-randomized per participant with the restrictions that the same
concept could never appear twice in a row and that no more than four
true or four false trials appeared in a row.
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Procedure
Participants ﬁrst did the property veriﬁcation task, which followed the
same procedure as in Experiment 1, although without the Chinese ideo-
graph evaluations. Participants could then take a break and proceed
to the lexical decision task on their own. They were told that the task
tested their ability to focus and that they had to indicate as quickly
and accurately as possible whether a presented word was an existing
Dutch word by pressing one of two keys. During the lexical decision
task, participants saw the twelve target concepts and four additional
ﬁllers. These 16 concepts were matched with 16 non-words, which were
created with the same letters as the target concepts and also started
with the same initial letters. Each trial started with a ﬁxation cross
presented at the center of the screen for 300 ms, followed by a blank
for 200 ms and the target concept, which remained on the screen until
participants gave a response. Participants ﬁrst did six practice trials
with unrelated words and then saw three consecutive blocks of the 32
trials (16 concepts and 16 non-words) without a break in between. The
presentation order was randomized per participant and block with the
restriction that no more than four words or four non-words could appear
in a row.
After the lexical decision task, participants could again take a break
and then proceeded to the concept evaluations. They were reminded
that they had veriﬁed properties for concept words at the beginning of
the experiment and were told that we wanted to assess how positive or
negative these concept words were for them in order to better understand
our results. We instructed participants that there were no right or wrong
answers and that they shouldn't think too long about each answer, but
should answer spontaneously and intuitively. Then the twelve target
concepts appeared one after another in a random order with a 6-point
rating scale (ends labeled negative and positive) with the sentence I
ﬁnd <concept>... displayed above the scale.
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Modality Exposure RT ACC
Condition Condition M(SD) N M(SD) N
multi- single 1142.64 (209.21) 36 .62 (0.23) 37
modality repeated 897.99 (116.34) 36 .80 (0.16) 37
single- single 1067.53 (194.46) 36 .70 (0.20) 37
modality repeated 896.75 (105.07) 36 .85 (0.11) 37
Table 4.2: Mean reaction times (RT, in milliseconds) and accuracy rates (ACC,
percentage) during the property veriﬁcation task in experiment 2 as a
function of the modality and exposure conditions
4.5.2 Results
Property veriﬁcation task
We analyzed response latencies on true trials of the property veriﬁcation
task if the trial was answered correctly and the latency was slower than
300 ms and faster than 2 SD of the respective condition mean. We sub-
mitted these and the participants' accuracy rates to 2 (modality condi-
tion) × 2 (exposure condition) repeated measures ANOVAs. For the re-
sponse latencies, the analysis yielded the expected eﬀect of the modality
condition, F (1, 35)1 = 5.65, p = .023, η2p = .14, an eﬀect of the exposure
condition, F (1, 35) = 105.42, p < .01, η2p = .75, and an interaction eﬀect
between modality and exposure, F (1, 35) = 4.48, p = .042, η2p = .11. As
the means in Table 4.2 indicate, participants were faster on trials with
single-modality concepts than on trials with multi-modality concepts.
Not surprisingly, participants were also faster on concept-property pairs
that re-occurred than that appeared only once. The interaction eﬀect
further shows that the processing advantage of single-modality concepts
over multi-modality concepts existed when each concept-property pair
was shown once, F (1, 35) = 6.06, p = .019, η2p = .15, but was at-
tenuated when participants saw each concept-property pair four times,
F (1, 35) < 1.
1Degrees of freedom vary due to an empty cell for one participant after removing
outliers from the reaction time data.
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Similarly, the analysis of participants' accuracy rates yielded the
predicted main eﬀect of the modality condition, F (1, 36) = 9.01, p =
.005, η2p = .20 and a main eﬀect of the exposure condition, F (1, 36) =
38.36, p < .001, η2p = .52, but no interaction, F (1, 36) < 1: Participants
were more accurate on trials with single-modality concepts than on trials
with multi-modality concepts and they were more accurate on concept-
property pairs that appeared repeatedly (see Table 4.2).
Lexical decision task
Again we only analyzed latencies on correctly answered trials and if the
response fell within a 300 ms to 2 SD interval of the respective condition
mean. We hypothesized that concepts paired with properties from dif-
ferent modalities gain a richer semantic representation. Therefore, these
concepts should be recognized faster during lexical decisions. However,
despite the fact that we have carefully piloted and selected the stim-
ulus materials based on valence and typicality, it is possible that the
target concepts diﬀer in their natural accessibility. Therefore, we em-
ployed a multi-level approach to our repeated measures design, including
the modality and exposure conditions, the diﬀerent concept words, the
speciﬁc list of stimulus combinations a participant saw, and all their
interaction terms as factors. Furthermore, during the property veriﬁca-
tion task, participants were more accurate on single-modality concepts
than on multi-modality concepts. To control for the possibility that
the concept accessibility is driven by participants' (in)accuracy, we used
each participants' accuracy score for each concept as a covariate.
The analysis yielded the predicted main eﬀect of the modality con-
dition, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 5.60, p = .018. Participants recognized
multi-modality concepts faster than single-modality concepts (see Ta-
ble 4.3). The analysis further revealed a main eﬀect of the exposure
condition, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 3.91, p = .048, indicating that partic-
ipants recognized repeated concepts faster. Interestingly, the analysis
also yielded an interaction between the modality and exposure condi-
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Modality Exposure LDT: RT Evaluations
Condition Condition M(SD) N M(SD) N
multi- single 548.37 (94.48) 37 4.43 (1.76) 37
modality repeated 531.89 (79.53) 37 4.47 (1.74) 37
single- single 550.33 (80.27) 37 4.27 (1.76) 37
modality repeated 551.65 (84.23) 37 4.56 (1.70) 37
Table 4.3: Mean reaction times during the lexical decision task (LDT: RT, in mil-
liseconds) and explicit concept evaluations in experiment 2 as a function
of the modality and exposure conditions
tions, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 4.56, p = .033: The expected and ob-
served accessibility advantage of multi-modality concepts over single-
modality concepts was enhanced by repeated exposures, Wald X 2(df =
1) = 12.94, p < .001, but not evident for single-exposure concepts,
Wald X 2(df = 1) < 1, p = .730 (see Table 4.3).2
Concept evaluations
We predicted that the representational richness experienced with con-
cepts associated with multi-modality properties inﬂuences the partic-
ipants' evaluation of these concept words. Speciﬁcally, we hypothe-
sized that multi-modality concepts are evaluated as more positive than
single-modality concepts, but that this diﬀerence should be attenuated
through repeated exposures to the concepts. Given the same logic as
for the analyses of the lexical decision task, we used a multi-level anal-
ysis including the modality and exposure conditions, the diﬀerent con-
cept words, the speciﬁc list a participant saw, and all their interac-
tion terms as factors, and participants' accuracy rate for each concept
2The analysis further showed main and interaction eﬀects of the particular concept
words. However, these are not of theoretical interest to the current experiments and
we will therefore not discuss them.
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as a covariate. Of the eﬀects of interest,3 the analysis only yielded
the expected interaction between the modality and exposure conditions,
Wald X 2(df = 1) = 4.62, p = .032, indicating that participants liked
multi- and single-modality concepts equally after repeated exposures,
Wald X 2(df = 1) = .05, p = .827, but they tended to like multi-
modality concepts more than single-modality concepts in the single-
exposure condition, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 2.27, p = .099 (see means in
Table 4.3).
4.5.3 Discussion
In line with previous experiments (Pecher et al., 2004), participants veri-
ﬁed properties for concepts faster if the diﬀerent properties involved only
a single modality than if they involved multiple modalities. However, we
demonstrated that concepts associated with multi-modality properties
became subsequently more accessible, as indexed by a lexical decision
task, and were evaluated as more positive than the concepts paired with
single-modality properties. We propose that the semantic richness of the
representations underlies these ﬁndings, such that multi-modality pro-
cessing increases a concept's representational richness. Furthermore, as
predicted, repeated exposure to a concept attenuated the eﬀect on the
explicit concept evaluations: Whereas concepts in the multi-modality
condition were evaluated as relatively positive even after only one expo-
sure per concept-property pair, single-modality concepts only became
positive after repeated exposures.
Interestingly, the manipulation of modality and exposure also inter-
acted in determining the concept's accessibility. Participants were faster
at recognizing multi-modality concepts than single-modality concepts,
but this was particularly the case if the concept-property pairs were
presented repeatedly. Our results might therefore suggest that represen-
3The analysis further showed main and interaction eﬀects of the particular concept
words. However, these are not of theoretical interest to the current experiments and
we will therefore not discuss them.
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tational richness inﬂuences processes diﬀerently depending on whether
they take place outside of an individual's awareness, as in the case of the
lexical decision task, or whether they are contingent on explicit evalua-
tion processes. Whereas the accessibility diﬀerence between multi- and
single-modality properties was increased upon repeated exposures, the
evaluation diﬀerence was attenuated upon repeated exposures.
4.6 General Discussion
The current experiments provide evidence that although processing con-
cepts within a multi-modality context produces switching costs, the re-
sulting processing experience is positive and yields a higher accessibility
and more positive evaluation for the respective concepts. Speciﬁcally, in
Experiment 1, we demonstrated that although participants are slower
at verifying sequences of concept-property pairs from diﬀerent modali-
ties than sequences of pairs from one single modality, they experience
more positive aﬀect after multi-modality contexts, as indicated by higher
pleasantness ratings of Chinese ideographs. We thus replicated previous
experiments investigating the costs of processing multi-modality stim-
uli (Pecher et al., 2003, 2004; Van Dantzig et al., 2008; Vermeulen et
al., 2008), but showed that such processing experiences can have af-
fective consequences. We proposed that the underlying mechanism is
the current representational richness of these concepts and tested this
in Experiment 2 by manipulating whether a concept was paired with
properties from diﬀerent modalities or with properties from just one
modality. Again, we replicated the switching cost: Participants veriﬁed
concept-property pairs faster if all properties involved the same modality
(cf. Pecher et al., 2004), but showed that multi-modality concepts be-
came subsequently more accessible and were evaluated more positively
than single-modality concepts.
We suggest that our ﬁndings corroborate the idea that concept rep-
resentations are not static, but are instead construed in a dynamic and
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contextualized manner (cf. E. R. Smith, 1996; E. R. Smith & DeCoster,
1998), taking into account, for example, recent experiences with the
concept. Our results are therefore consistent with theories of situated
cognition (cf. E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004), supporting the proposal
that the human conceptual system is embodied and situated (Barsalou,
1999, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg et al., 2009; Yeh & Barsalou,
2006; Zwaan et al., 2004). Moreover, while embodied theories of cogni-
tion propose that it is necessary to ground cognition in modality-speciﬁc
systems in order to grasp the meaning of something (cf. Harnad, 1990;
Searle, 1980; see also Glenberg & Robertson, 2000), the current experi-
ments show that representations become richer the more modalities they
incorporate, facilitating the construction of meaning. In other words,
we propose that the more modalities are involved in a representation,
the more meaningful it becomes. Importantly, however, although the
focus of the present work has been on the ﬂexibility and situatedness
of human cognition, we do not assume that conceptualizations are only
situationally driven. While there is variability in concept representa-
tions (e.g., Barsalou, 1993) intra-individual stability can be achieved by
assuming that particular aspects and properties of a concept have been
repeatedly construed, thus forming a default representation. Stability
across individuals can similarly be achieved by assuming that a) (con-
versational) situations imply restraints relevant for the representation
and that b) generally individuals are likely to have similar experiences
due to the common cognitive system and socio-cultural conventions (cf.
Barsalou, 1999).
Furthermore, whereas previous research within the embodied cogni-
tion framework has shown that concept representations can be dynamic
(e.g., Borghi et al., 2004; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan et al.,
2004), the current research to our knowledge provides the ﬁrst exper-
imental evidence that this representational ﬂexibility has implications
for an individual's processing experience per se. Despite the process-
ing diﬃculty associated with modality-switching, participants reported
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more (implicit) positive aﬀect and evaluated multi-modality concepts
more positively than single-modality concepts. Speciﬁcally, encoding
concepts with multi-modality properties as compared to single-modality
properties elevated their explicit evaluation to the same extent as the
well-known mere-exposure eﬀect (Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968). This
is remarkable and further supports the idea that multi-modal experi-
ences foster familiarity.
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5Chapter 5
Can't Read It, Must Eat It:
Processing Fluency and
Self-Control
This chapter is based on:
Regenberg, N. F. E., Häfner, M., & Semin, G. R. (2010). Can't read it, must eat it.
Processing ﬂuency and self-control. Manuscript in preparation.
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Abstract
Processing ﬂuency is the subjective ease with which individ-
uals process information, which can signiﬁcantly aﬀect judg-
ments and decision making. However, little is known about
the functional value of such ﬂuency experiences. We pro-
pose that (dis)ﬂuency has a function for self-regulation, such
that the experience of disﬂuency signals the need to upreg-
ulate self-control. According to the limited-resource model
of self-regulation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), all acts of
self-control draw on one common resource, undermining sub-
sequent attempts of self-control. We hypothesized that disﬂu-
ency decreases the resources available for self-control. In two
experiments, we manipulated perceptual ﬂuency and subse-
quently assessed participants' capacity for self-control. After
experiencing perceptual disﬂuency, participants gave up more
quickly on an unsolvable task (Experiment 1) and failed to
resist a temptation (Experiment 2). Our ﬁndings therefore
corroborate the idea that ﬂuency experiences are important
for self-regulation.
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Imagine going out for dinner to a new restaurant. When reading
through the menu, you have to focus a little, because it is written in
a diﬃcult-to-read font, but, in general, you start getting the feeling
that you are at a very fancy restaurant where the dishes require an
exceptionally skillful cook. Without you noticing, your judgment of
how eﬀortful the preparation of the dishes is may have been inﬂuenced
by the processing diﬃculty of reading the menu, as research shows that
experiencing processing ease or diﬃculty can aﬀect eﬀort predictions
(Song & Schwarz, 2008b). However, will the eﬀort you spend on reading
this menu as compared to an easy-to-read menu also make it harder
for you to resist the temptation to order a chocolate tart as dessert
or to follow the waiter's suggestion to order a selection of appetizers
even though you're not actually that hungry? In the present work, we
examine the hypothesis that the experience of processing diﬃculty, or
disﬂuency, draws on self-regulatory resources, which are subsequently
unavailable for self-regulation.
Much research suggests that the metacognitive experiences during
information processing, such as a feeling of processing ease or diﬃculty,
inﬂuence an individual's judgments above and beyond the information's
declarative value. Most prominently, easy-to-process stimuli are typi-
cally liked more than diﬃcult-to-process stimuli (Bornstein, 1989; Re-
ber et al., 1998; Zajonc, 1968) and produce a positive aﬀective response
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001). In general, any cognition can be placed
on a continuum from eﬀortless to eﬀortful and generates a correspond-
ing metacognitive experience ranging from ﬂuent to disﬂuent (Alter &
Oppenheimer, 2009). For example, a menu can be easy or diﬃcult to
read, stock names can be easy or diﬃcult to pronounce, or aphorisms
can rhyme vs. not. A vast amount of research shows that such ubiqui-
tous cues and their resulting ﬂuency experience aﬀect judgments, as the
dishes on the diﬃcult-to-read menu are thought to require more eﬀort
(Song & Schwarz, 2008b), easy-to-pronounce stock names outperform
diﬃcult-to-pronounce stock names (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2006), and
rhyming aphorisms seem truer than non-rhyming aphorisms (McGlone
& Toﬁghbakhsh, 2000). Processing ﬂuency can further lead to feelings of
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familiarity (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998) and feelings of conﬁdence
(e.g., Novemsky et al., 2007). Whereas previous research has addressed
various manipulations and outcome variables of processing ﬂuency (cf.
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz et al., 2008), we
sought to examine the functional value of such ﬂuency experiences.
We propose that the experience of ﬂuency is instrumental to adapt
ongoing cognitions to the situation at hand and that the metacognitive
feelings triggered by disﬂuency promote self-control. Particularly, we
assume that the experience of disﬂuency provides information that the
current situation is problematic, creating the need to upregulate self-
control, as more eﬀortful processing might be required. Indeed, theories
of situated cognition (cf. Schwarz, 2002; E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004)
assume that our cognitive processes are tuned to the characteristics and
requirements of the situation. Aﬀective responses within a situation,
including metacognitive experiences, can signal the need to adapt one's
current processing style (cf. Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 1996).
However, whereas there is abundant evidence for the eﬀect of feelings
on evaluative judgments (cf. Winkielman et al., 2002) and on processing
styles (cf. Schwarz, 2002), we aim to show that the metacognitive feeling
of disﬂuency and the more eﬀortful processing style it coincides with
generally inﬂuence an individual's capacity for self-control.
Self-control is fundamental to every-day functioning, as we often
need to override or interrupt immediate responses to attain our goals
(Carver & Scheier, 1998). We may, for example, need to eﬀortfully
override an impulsive reaction, such as ordering a chocolate tart when
we have a dieting goal. According to the strength model of self-control
(Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), individuals have access to a common,
but limited resource for self-regulation. Any exertion of self-control
draws on  and depletes  this resource, which will therefore be un-
available for subsequent acts of volition (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeis-
ter, 1998). Abundant evidence has accumulated corroborating this idea
of resource depletion (for a recent review see Hagger, Wood, Stiﬀ, &
Chatzisarantis, 2010). In the current work, we present a novel inte-
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gration of these ﬁndings with research on processing ﬂuency. Based
on the assumption that ﬂuency is functional for self-monitoring and
self-control, we hypothesize that experiencing disﬂuency increases self-
control, thereby depleting the general resource. Thus, after a disﬂuency
experience, an individual should perform worse on a secondary task re-
quiring self-control.
The idea that ﬂuency plays a role for self-control has been implicitly
addressed by previous research on ﬂuency eﬀects. For instance, Alter
and colleagues (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007) showed that
the experience of disﬂuency lead participants to adopt a deeper, more
analytic processing style, suggesting that ﬂuency not only directly af-
fects judgments (cf. Schwarz, 2004), but also provides a mechanism
for strategy selection (see also Häfner & Stapel, 2009, 2010). In one
experiment, participants who received information in a diﬃcult-to-read
font engaged in more systematic processing and relied less on (faulty)
heuristics than participants who received the information in an easy-
to-read font (Schwarz, 2004). Similarly, Song and Schwarz (2008a)
demonstrated that individuals are less likely to fall prey to mislead-
ing questions, as How many animals of each kind did Moses take on
the arc? (the biblical actor was Noah, not Moses) when the questions
are presented in a diﬃcult-to-read vs. an easy-to-read font. More-
over, research particularly in the domains of learning and memory (cf.
Koriat, Ma'ayan, & Nussinson, 2006) similarly suggests that metacog-
nitive experiences, such as a feeling of processing ﬂuency, are essential
constituents of the self-regulation process (Efklides, 2008, p. 277), as
they make the person aware of the state of his or her cognition and trig-
ger control processes that serve the pursued goal of the self-regulation
process (Efklides, 2008, p. 282; see also Koriat, 2007; T. O. Nelson
& Narens, 1994). For example, the experience of ease-of-learning inﬂu-
ences study strategies, such that more time is allocated to items with
a comparatively low ease-of-learning (T. O. Nelson & Leonesio, 1988;
Son & Metcalfe, 2000). These examples seem to suggest that disﬂuency
is functional in that it triggers self-control processes to deploy more re-
sources to the diﬃcult items in order to master them. We assume that
83
Sensible Moves
the experience of disﬂuency is generally associated with increased at-
tempts of self-regulation. While this might be functional in the domain
at hand (e.g., studying the items), the common resources available for
self-regulation should become depleted and therefore less available for
subsequent attempts of self-control.
In the current research, we sought to directly test the premise that
the experience of disﬂuency triggers self-control processes. We predicted
that processing information in a disﬂuent way depletes self-regulatory re-
sources, leading to impoverished self-control afterwards. In Experiment
1, participants received the instructions for a task measuring persis-
tence in an easy-to-read vs. a diﬃcult-to-read manner. In Experiment
2, we investigated the eﬀect of perceptual (dis)ﬂuency on behavioral
self-control by assessing whether chronic dieters would be more suscep-
tible to choose a chocolate bar over an apple for ﬁlling in a questionnaire
when the questionnaire had been diﬃcult vs. easy to read.
5.1 Experiment 1: Persistence on an Unsolvable
Task
We hypothesized that experiencing disﬂuency as compared to ﬂuency de-
pletes self-regulatory resources and therefore deteriorates an individual's
persistence on a secondary task. We manipulated ﬂuency vs. disﬂuency
by giving participants easy-to-read vs. diﬃcult-to-read instructions (cf.
Song & Schwarz, 2010) and thereafter assessed resource depletion by
measuring how long they would persist on an unsolvable task: Partici-
pants had to ﬁnd the diﬀerence between two images which were actually
identical (Koch et al., 2009). Persistence on an unsolvable task measures
self-regulatory depletion, because persistence requires overriding the ap-
pealing response of quitting (Muraven et al., 1998). We thus expected
participants in the disﬂuent condition to give up sooner than partici-
pants in the ﬂuent condition.
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5.1.1 Method
Participants and design
Twenty-nine students participated in the experiment for a monetary
reward or course-credit and were randomly assigned to the ﬂuent or
disﬂuent condition. We excluded the data of two participants because
they failed to follow the experimental instructions in an unrelated part
of the experiment.
Procedure
The experiment was introduced as a new part of a longer experimental
session. Participants were individually seated in cubicles and received
all instructions from a computer. We manipulated ﬂuency by varying
the font in which the instructions were written: either easily readable
(Arial) or diﬃcult to read (Mistral). We told participants that they
would do a search puzzle in which they had to look for the diﬀerence
between two images. We told them to press a once they had found
the diﬀerence and that they would then get the opportunity to describe
it, or that they could press b, if they wanted to stop or abort. In
order to deconfound the reading time for the instructions with the time
participants spent on the actual task, the experiment was programmed
in a way that participants read the instructions and then had to click on
a button to make the (actually identical) images appear. The dependent
variable was the time participants spent looking at the images, i.e., from
pressing the button to make the images appear until they pressed a
or b. We also measured the reading time for the instructions as a
manipulation check: Participants in the disﬂuency condition should take
longer than participants in the ﬂuency condition.
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5.1.2 Results and Discussion
A regression analysis of the ﬂuency condition on the reading times con-
ﬁrmed that participants required more time to read the disﬂuent instruc-
tions (M = 35.72 seconds, SD = 12.58, n = 13) than the ﬂuent instruc-
tions (M = 23.36 seconds, SD = 10.33, n = 14), t(25) = 2.80, p = .010,
β = .49. More importantly, as predicted, participants in the ﬂuent
condition spent signiﬁcantly more time on trying to ﬁnd the diﬀerence
between the two images (M = 124.31 seconds, SD = 70.97) than par-
ticipants in the disﬂuent condition (M = 66.19 seconds, SD = 22.78),
t(25) = −2.82, p = .009, β = −.49. The strength of this ﬁnding  par-
ticipants in the ﬂuent condition persisted twice as long as participants
in the disﬂuent condition  lends strong support for the hypothesis that
the experience of disﬂuency depletes self-regulatory resources. However,
the experiment does not allow a conclusive argument of resource de-
pletion, as diﬃcult-to-read instructions might also have decreased par-
ticipants' motivation to invest eﬀort in the experiment leading to less
persistence irrespective of self-regulatory resources. Although Muraven
and Baumeister (2000) have suggested that motivation and self-control
strength may interact in determining self-regulation rather than being
mutually exclusive explanations, we sought a second experiment to in-
vestigate the eﬀect of perceptual ﬂuency on an unrelated, behavioral
measure, rendering motivation irrelevant to the measure.
5.2 Experiment 2: Resisting Temptation
We designed this experiment to provide converging evidence for the idea
that experiencing disﬂuency depletes self-regulatory resources while ex-
cluding motivation as an alternative explanation. Participants ﬁlled in
a questionnaire that was manipulated to be easy vs. diﬃcult to read.
Afterwards, they could choose between an apple and a chocolate bar
as compensation for their participation. We assumed that this choice
poses a self-regulatory challenge for restrained eaters (Herman & Polivy,
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1980), who are chronically concerned with their food intake. While they
might want the chocolate, they should override this response and choose
the apple instead. However, as this requires self-regulatory resources,
we predicted that after ﬁlling in the disﬂuent questionnaire, restrained
eaters would fail at this self-regulatory attempt, such that they are more
likely to choose the chocolate over the apple. For unrestrained eaters,
on the other hand, the choice between apple and chocolate should not
involve self-regulation and we didn't expect an eﬀect of the ﬂuency ma-
nipulation on their choice.
5.2.1 Method
Participants and design
We received complete questionnaires from 70 participants (ﬁve addi-
tional participants failed to ﬁll in the restrained eating questionnaire
and three wanted neither an apple nor a chocolate bar). We excluded
ﬁve participants from the analyses, because they indicated to be cur-
rently dieting to loose weight, as prior research indicates that current
dieters are typically better at regulating (impulsive) eating (Guerrieri,
Nederkoorn, Schrooten, Martijn, & Jansen, 2009; cf. Lowe, 1993). The
resulting sample of 65 participants was distributed equally across both
experimental conditions (33 in the ﬂuent condition).
Procedure
Participants were approached in a computer work-room at the university
and asked whether they could ﬁll in a 10-minute questionnaire. They
then received a 48-item Big Five questionnaire, which was either printed
black on white (ﬂuent) or with the font color in a 30% gray shade on
white (disﬂuent), making it look like a barely readable photocopy. Upon
completing their questionnaire, they were to approach the experimenter
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and could choose between receiving an apple and a chocolate bar for
participating in the experiment. The apple and the chocolate bar were
of an approximately equal monetary value. After making their choice,
participants received a second questionnaire, which was well-readable in
both conditions. It included a one-item mood measure (How do you
feel at this moment?) to be answered on a 7-point Likert scale from 1
= `bad to 7 = good. Furthermore, we assessed the participants' expe-
rience while ﬁlling in the Big Five questionnaire, including the amount
of experienced pleasure, enjoyment, motivation, diﬃculty, exhaustion,
and their perception of the questionnaire's layout and readability, all
responded to on 7-point Likert scales. The last two items served as a
manipulation check of our ﬂuency manipulation; we included the other
items to assess potential confounds of the expected depletion eﬀect. Fi-
nally, participants ﬁlled in the Dutch version of the concern for dieting
subscale of the revised restrained scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980; Jansen,
Oosterlaan, Merckelbach, & Hout, 1988). This scale consists of six items
that assess participants' chronic motivation to control their weight by
dieting, e.g., How conscious are you of what you are eating? and I
feel guilty after having eaten too much. Due to reliability concerns we
dropped the item Would a weight ﬂuctuation of 2.5 kilograms (ca. 5 lb)
aﬀect the way you live your life?, resulting in reliable scale (Cronbach's
α = .83). As the scale includes diﬀerent answer formats, all analyses
were done with a Z-transformed scale mean.
5.2.2 Results and Discussion
Manipulation checks and potential confounds
Participants thought that the layout of the questionnaire, t(64) = −3.82,
p < .001, β = −.43, and readability of the questionnaire, t(64) = −9.35,
p < .001, β = −.76, were signiﬁcantly worse in the disﬂuent condition
(Mlayout = 4.48, SD = 1.24; Mreadability = 3.26, SD = 1.63) than in the
ﬂuent condition (Mlayout = 5.42, SD = 0.75; Mreadability = 6.27, SD =
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Figure 5.1: Predicted probability of choosing the chocolate as a function of re-
strained eating (operationalized as 1 SD above vs. below the scale
mean) and the ﬂuency manipulation in Experiment 2.
0.91). However, the ﬂuency manipulation had no eﬀect on participants'
mood, t(64) < 1, their motivation, t(64) < 1, their enjoyment of ﬁlling in
the questionnaire, t(64) < 1, the amount of pleasure they experienced,
t(64) = −1.10, p = .28, β = −.14, the diﬃculty they experienced,
t(64) = 1.57, p = .12, β = .19, or how exhausted they felt, t(64) < 1.
Choice for apple or chocolate
To assess the hypothesis that the eﬀect of the ﬂuency manipulation on
the participants' choice for the apple vs. the chocolate would be mod-
erated by their score on the restrained eating scale, we performed a
logistic regression analysis following the procedure suggested by Hayes
and Matthes (2009) with the ﬂuency manipulation as a categorical inde-
pendent variable (fluent = 0; disfluent = 1) and the restrained eating
scale as the moderator. It yielded no main eﬀect of the ﬂuency condi-
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tion, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 0.15, p = .697, B = −0.25, Exp(B) = .78,
no main eﬀect of restrained eating, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 2.10, p = .147,
B = 0.98, Exp(B) = 2.67, but the expected interaction between ﬂuency
and restrained eating, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 4.82, B = −1.99, p = .028,
Exp(B) = 0.14, 95% CI[0.02, 0.81]. We further explored this interac-
tion by analyzing the conditional eﬀects of the ﬂuency manipulation for
restrained eaters (1 SD above the mean) and for unrestrained eaters (1
SD below the mean). For unrestrained eaters, ﬂuency was not predictive
of the participants' choice between chocolate and apple, Wald X 2(df =
1) = 1.92, p = .165, B = 1.23, 95% CI[−0.51, 1.98], whereas for re-
strained eaters, the ﬂuency manipulation made a marginally signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence in the expected direction, Wald X 2(df = 1) = 3.22,
p = .073, 95% CI[−3.62, 0.16]. Thus, restrained eaters tended to choose
the chocolate more often after ﬁlling in the disﬂuent questionnaire than
after ﬁlling in the ﬂuent questionnaire (see Figure 5.1).
5.3 General Discussion
In the present experiments, we provided support for the hypothesis that
experiencing disﬂuency depletes self-regulatory resources. In Experi-
ment 1, participants who received instructions in a ﬂuent manner per-
sisted twice as long on an unsolvable task than participants who received
the instructions in a disﬂuent manner. In Experiment 2, restrained
eaters were more likely to choose a chocolate bar over an apple for par-
ticipating in an experiment after ﬁlling in a disﬂuent questionnaire than
after ﬁlling in a ﬂuent questionnaire, whereas unrestrained eaters, for
whom the choice between apple and chocolate posed no self-regulatory
concern, were not inﬂuenced by the ﬂuency manipulation. Our ﬁnd-
ings corroborate the idea that ﬂuency experiences are important for
self-regulation.
However, alternative explanations of our results are conceivable.
First, our eﬀects could merely be driven by the increased amount of cog-
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nitive eﬀort that is necessary to process disﬂuent vs. ﬂuent stimuli with-
out the requirement of self-regulation. However, we think that this ex-
planation is unlikely given that non-regulatory eﬀortful tasks have been
used as a control condition in experiments investigating self-regulation
(e.g., Muraven et al., 1998, Experiment 3). Second, another explana-
tion could be that disﬂuency decreased participants' motivation to do
the task (Experiment 1) or produced the feeling that they deserved the
chocolate as a reward after ﬁlling in the diﬃcult-to-read questionnaire
(Experiment 2). However, our ﬂuency manipulation had no eﬀect on
participants' self-reported motivation or enjoyment while ﬁlling in the
questionnaire in Experiment 2. Moreover, neither the motivation nor
the reward explanation would predict an interaction between our ﬂu-
ency manipulation and restrained eating  which we hypothesized and
found based on the idea that ﬂuency experiences play a role in self-
control. Therefore, both the motivation and reward explanations seem
unlikely.
Although eﬀects of self-regulatory depletion have been linked to sub-
jective eﬀort and task diﬃculty (cf. Hagger et al., 2010; Muraven &
Baumeister, 2000), our contribution is novel as we introduce disﬂuency
as a subtle and unobtrusive manipulation of self-regulation. Whereas
prior research has often employed the eﬀortful suppression of an im-
pulse or the overriding of a habitual response (cf. Hagger et al., 2010),
we demonstrate that even subtle changes, such as the font in which
instructions are printed, can draw upon self-regulatory resources.
Moreover, our ﬁndings provide valuable insights into the functional
role of processing ﬂuency. Whereas previous research has largely focused
on the impact ﬂuency has on judgments and decision making (cf. Alter
& Oppenheimer, 2009; Schwarz, 2004), the current experiments reveal
directly and for the ﬁrst time that processing ﬂuency plays a role in
self-regulation. Processing disﬂuent information depletes self-regulatory
resources. Overall, our results are of potential interest, for instance,
for our understanding of consumer behavior: Individuals might be per-
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suaded more easily into having the chocolate dessert if the menu is writ-
ten in a diﬃcult-to-read font or to comply with a charitable request (cf.
Fennis, Janssen, & Vohs, 2009) when ﬁrst ﬁlling in a diﬃcult-to-read
questionnaire.
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General Discussion
The present dissertation explored diﬀerent antecedents and consequences
of processing ﬂuency. I investigated how feelings of ﬂuency can be trig-
gered by visuo-motor and sensory experiences. Moreover, I explored the
role of ﬂuency for self-regulation. I will now summarize my main results
while providing a brief sketch of their position within and contribution
to existing theories and empirical work. In addition, I will outline new
research questions which my ﬁndings have sparked.
6.1 Fluency From the Motor System
6.1.1 Summary
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation I applied an ecological approach
to perception and action. Accordingly, I assumed that individuals in-
terpret the meaning of a situation by automatically analyzing their ac-
tion capabilities within the situation, in other words, by deriving ac-
tion aﬀordances. Therefore, perceptual properties of the environment
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should drive an individual's construal of the situation. I hypothesized
that acting in line with perceived action aﬀordances would be notably
easier than acting against such aﬀordances. This facilitation has previ-
ously been shown within a number of experiments employing a stimulus-
response paradigm (e.g., Symes et al., 2007; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001,
2004). Such experiments consistently ﬁnd that participants respond
faster and more accurately when the perceived aﬀordances match the
required response.
Based on the considerable amount of research on the eﬀects of pro-
cessing ﬂuency (cf. Schwarz, 2004) and the assumption that any variable
that facilitates processing should give rise to ﬂuency eﬀects (cf. Alter
& Oppenheimer, 2009), I hypothesized that the ease associated with
performing aﬀorded actions as compared to unaﬀorded actions should
equally produce feelings of ﬂuency. In Chapter 2, I provided support
for this hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, participants experienced a diﬀuse pos-
itive feeling after acting in congruence with perceived aﬀordances and
they were able to report a feeling of ﬂuency. These ﬁndings are in line
with recent similar research, showing that acting in congruence with
action aﬀordances produces positive aﬀect, as measured by facial EMG
(Cannon et al., 2010). In addition, the results of Chapter 2 provide
a valuable extension in that they show that individuals have access to
this ﬂuency experience and can consciously report on it. Moreover, I
measured participants' feeling state by asking them to evaluate neutral
objects, namely Chinese ideographs. The fact that these evaluations
were driven by perceptuo-motor ﬂuency provides strong support for our
hypotheses, as the ideographs were unrelated to the actual ﬂuency expe-
rience. Participants' feeling state thus even transferred to an unrelated
target (cf. Monahan, Murphy, & Zajonc, 2000, Experiment 2).
In sum, my ﬁndings imply that ﬂuency can be triggered by percep-
tuo-motor processes and thus corroborate the underpinnings of ecologi-
cal theories of perception (Gibson, 1979) and generally theories assum-
ing a direct coupling between perception and action (Hommel et al.,
2001; Prinz, 1997; E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004). Moreover, the research
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described in Chapter 3 further supports and extends this notion: Not
only can acting within an environment produce feelings of ﬂuency when
the actions are congruent with perceived aﬀordances, but the percep-
tion of an easy vs. a more diﬃcult course of action can also drive choice
preferences. Thus, not only are aﬀorded actions easier, the mere an-
ticipation of such processing ease already aﬀects judgments. Chapter
3 further provides valuable insights into the mechanics of such bodily
cues. The results show that aﬀordances are clearly body-speciﬁc, but
nevertheless malleable depending on the situational context. This is ev-
idence in support of the view that our cognitive processes are embodied
and dynamically situated (cf. Marsh, Johnston, Richardson, & Schmidt,
2009).
6.1.2 Outlook
Inﬂuence on judgments and decision making
Prior research has demonstrated that processing ﬂuency can aﬀect a
vast range of judgments. For example, ﬂuency not only produces posi-
tive aﬀect (Häfner & Stapel, 2010; Monahan et al., 2000; Winkielman &
Cacioppo, 2001), but can also inﬂuence an individual's liking for a stim-
ulus (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992; Reber et al., 1998; Zajonc, 1968),
aﬀect the truth value assigned to the processed information (Reber &
Schwarz, 1999; McGlone & Toﬁghbakhsh, 2000), increase the conﬁdence
one has in a current judgment (Alter et al., 2007; Novemsky et al., 2007),
and lead to a higher valuation of the information (Alter & Oppenheimer,
2006, 2008; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007). The research reported in this
dissertation is merely a starting point to explore whether ﬂuency can be
triggered by the motor system and is limited to demonstrating that the
interaction between perception and action produce feelings of ﬂuency
and positive aﬀect. These ﬁndings hence raise the question whether
(anticipated) physical interactions with one's environment can equally
produce ﬂuency outcomes on other variables. Indeed, an experiment
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by Hayes et al. (2008) demonstrates that individuals like objects bet-
ter after ﬂuent interactions with them than after disﬂuent interactions.
But it is up to future research to show whether other outcomes, which
have previously been found for perceptual or conceptual ﬂuency, can be
applied to perceptuo-motor ﬂuency. For example, would we place more
conﬁdence in a tool that we have used ﬂuently or would we overesti-
mate its usefulness compared to a tool we have used less ﬂuently? Also
a more applied link to consumer psychology is conceivable: Would we
value an object more if we've had an easy interaction with it and would
we therefore be willing to spend more money on it?
Fluency from bottom-up vs. top-down processes
In the current research, I have placed particular emphasis on the sit-
uatedness of aﬀordances and the resulting ﬂuency eﬀects. Within the
framework of ecological psychology, aﬀordances arise from the interac-
tion between an individual's capabilities and the situation, thus focusing
on the dynamics of the interaction (cf. Marsh et al., 2009). In the re-
search reported in this dissertation, these action capabilities were always
operationalized as physical properties. For example, the cups could be
grabbed with one's left or right hand (Chapter 2), or I investigated the
action preferences of left- and right-handers, or of right-handers act-
ing with their left or right hand (Chapter 3). However, it is likely that
intrapersonal variables also inﬂuence an individual's construal of a situa-
tion. For example, individuals overestimate the height of a balcony more
after a manipulation of arousal (Stefanucci & Storbeck, 2009). Similarly,
height perception is inﬂuenced by fear (Clerkin, Cody, Stefanucci, Prof-
ﬁtt, & Teachman, 2009; Stefanucci, Proﬃtt, Clore, & Parekh, 2008).
This means that not only physical, bodily variables determine how we
perceive the environment, but psychological variables such as an emo-
tional state or a disposition can also play a role. Likewise, goals can
inﬂuence and modulate sensorimotor representations (Bub & Masson,
2010). Thus, feelings of ﬂuency may not only arise as a function of
physical aﬀordances. Rather, internal mental states might be equally
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important (cf. Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). Future research might proﬁt
from an analysis of the extent to which sensorimotor ﬂuency experiences
are situated within a bottom-up, environmentally driven perception
and to what extent top-down internal states play a role.
Interpersonal action ﬂuency
Finally, in the present research, I explored the eﬀects of one individual's
perceptions and actions on the experience of ﬂuency. However, in many
situations, we act jointly with others. Based on the idea that perception
and action share common neural substrates (Prinz, 1997), Sebanz and
colleagues (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003) predicted and found that
when performing a shared task, individuals automatically represent the
actions of others as if they were their own  even though this led to a
decreased performance than when participants executed the task alone.
Thus, if participants perceive aﬀordances for another person, it is con-
ceivable that the ﬂuency experienced from acting in congruence with
these aﬀordances could also be shared. For example, would we like
an object more, if we observe another person's ﬂuent interaction with
it as compared to a disﬂuent interaction? There is some experimental
support for this suggestion. In two experiments, participants watched
movie clips of another person's ﬂuent or disﬂuent interaction with an
object (A. E. Hayes et al., 2008). The observers indeed liked objects
more after viewing ﬂuent interactions with them  at least when the
actor's gaze was visible. Thus, interpersonal action ﬂuency eﬀects seem
possible, but their conditions and limitations have yet to be investigated.
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6.2 Fluency From Multimodal Conceptual
Thought
6.2.1 Summary
While Chapters 2 and 3 dealt with actual interactions with one's envi-
ronment, in Chapter 4, I explored whether even conceptual thought can
give rise to embodied ﬂuency eﬀects. Particularly, I predicted that the
experience of ﬂuency during conceptual thought, such as language com-
prehension, is contingent on one's ease of constructing a concept's mean-
ing. According to perceptual theories of knowledge (Barsalou, 1999;
Glenberg, 1997) concept representations are dynamic and situationally
construed. Moreover, conceptual thought is believed to be modality-
speciﬁc. In other words, the same concept might invoke a dominantly
tactile representation in one situation and a dominantly visual repre-
sentation in another. In line with previous ﬁndings, I hypothesized that
the construction of meaning should be facilitated by representational
richness (Myers et al., 1984; E. E. Smith et al., 1978) and predicted
that representational richness, in turn, is increased by including more
modalities into a concept's representation.
The ﬁndings reported in Chapter 4 support this hypothesis. Con-
cepts encoded within a multi-modal processing (e.g., visual, auditory,
and tactile) context gained a richer semantic representation than con-
cepts encoded within a single-modality (e.g., visual) context. Moreover,
my ﬁndings show that this has consequences for an individual's process-
ing experience per se. Participants reported more positive mood after
multi-modal processing and they liked concepts associated with multi-
modal properties better than concepts associated with properties from
one modality.
These ﬁndings are intriguing, because previous research within the
embodied cognition approach has exclusively focused on the costs asso-
ciated with switching between modalities while processing (Pecher et al.,
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2003, 2004; Van Dantzig et al., 2008; Vermeulen et al., 2008). My ﬁnd-
ings show that albeit this initial cost, there is ultimately an advantage
to multi-modality processing, as reﬂected in the recognition speed for
previously encoded concepts and in participants' subjective processing
experience.
6.2.2 Outlook
Multi-modal mere exposure
In the second experiment discussed in Chapter 4, the processing dy-
namics of concepts encoded with multi-modal properties were assessed
against a mere-exposure control condition. Simply presenting concepts
with multi-modal properties caused an equal increase in the evalua-
tion of these concepts as the well-documented mere-exposure eﬀect (cf.
Bornstein, 1989). It might be relevant to consider the implications of
this ﬁnding, for example, when designing stimulus materials for any ar-
bitrary experiment. Pairing multi-modal properties with some stimuli
but not with others might unintentionally bias the evaluation of other-
wise neutral stimuli.
Furthermore, given the apparent strength of the eﬀect on the stim-
ulus evaluations, it might be useful to further explore the interactions
between mere-exposure contexts and multi-modality processing. In the
current experiment, a ceiling eﬀect was found regarding the repeated
presentation of single-modality concepts as compared to multi-modality
concepts. However, a further exploration of these interactions is war-
ranted as the eﬀects of mere-exposure might even be augmented by
multi-modal exposure.
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6.3 Fluency and Self-Regulation
6.3.1 Summary
In Chapter 5, I more generally explored the role of processing ﬂuency
for the self. Rather than assessing possible causes of ﬂuency within the
perception and action systems, I addressed self-regulatory depletion as
a possible consequence of experiencing disﬂuency. Particularly, I in-
vestigated the possibility that disﬂuency provides an internal feedback
signal about ongoing cognitive processes, informing an individual about
the need to adapt one's current processing style. I assumed this adapta-
tion to be an act of self-control, which should hence draw on the limited
resources available for self-regulation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).
Therefore, I hypothesized that individuals would be less able to exert
self-control after an experience of disﬂuency.
In two experiments involving diﬀerent measures of regulatory deple-
tion, this hypothesis was supported. These ﬁndings are hence consistent
with the hypothesis that our cognitive processes are situated to meet
situational demands (cf. Schwarz, 2002; E. R. Smith & Semin, 2004).
Furthermore, these results corroborate the idea that our perception and
understanding of both the environment and our own cognitions is tuned
to function cost-eﬀectively, leading to adaptive behavior. The ﬁndings of
Chapter 5 thereby suggest that a possible function of processing ﬂuency
is to preserve the economy of action (p. 110, Proﬃtt, 2006).
6.3.2 Outlook
Robustness of the eﬀect
To my knowledge, Chapter 5 oﬀers the ﬁrst test of the eﬀect of processing
ﬂuency on self-regulatory depletion. Despite the fascination and interest
that regulatory depletion eﬀects seem to receive within the scientiﬁc
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community (cf. Hagger et al., 2010), as any novel line of research, the
eﬀect should be subjected to close scrutiny and further exploration and
replication. Nevertheless, the results of the current dissertation oﬀer a
promising starting point for such investigations.
Source of the disﬂuency experience
In the current experiments, the experience of disﬂuency was unrelated
to the measure of self-regulation as is typically the case in regulatory
depletion paradigms (cf. Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). However, the
argument underlying the current hypotheses is that disﬂuency signals
the need to change one's current processing style. Therefore, individ-
uals might actually become better at self-regulation in the domain in
which disﬂuency was experienced. For example, if participants ﬁlled in
a questionnaire about healthy eating, which is manipulated to be easy-
or diﬃcult-to-read, would chronic dieters be more successful at refusing
the chocolate after ﬁlling in the disﬂuent questionnaire because of an
increased self-regulatory eﬀort to eat healthy?
Depletion and other ﬂuency outcomes
A question unanswered by the current research concerns the relationship
between self-regulation and other ﬂuency outcomes. It is well established
that ﬂuency can inﬂuence a vast array of judgments and decision making
(cf. Schwarz, 2004; Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). What is the role of
self-regulatory depletion in determining these outcomes? It remains up
to future research to explore these links and to analyze whether self-
regulatory depletion is merely a by-product of experiencing disﬂuency
or whether there is a causal relation to other ﬂuency outcomes.
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6.4 Coda
The research in this dissertation demonstrates that we are inﬂuenced
by the way in which we physically interact with our environment. Par-
alleling the eﬀects on perceptual and conceptual ﬂuency, smooth inter-
actions not only feel easy, but they elevate an individual's tonic mood
state. Thus, the meaning of a situation lies in the action possibilities
perceived within it, which are contingent on constraints imposed by
one's own body and the environment. Similarly, even the meaning of
understanding concepts, for example, during language comprehension,
is contingent on bodily-driven, sensorimotor representations. The cur-
rent research shows that the ease to derive meaning from concepts is
increased when more sources of sensory information are available.
I suggest that metacognitive experiences, such as a feeling of ﬂuency,
are functional because they reward and promote easy, cost-eﬀective be-
havior. Therefore, the experience of disﬂuency should also signal the
need to adapt current processes to better meet the contextual require-
ments. My research provides initial support for this hypothesis. In
sum, this dissertation corroborates the view that ﬂuency is a hedonic
cue which is a functional signal to maintain the status-quo or to initiate
a cognitive or behavioral change.
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Summary
In our daily lives, we are often not only inﬂuenced by what we are think-
ing but also by how easy these thoughts come to mind or how easy new
information can be processed. There is ample research to demonstrate
the eﬀects of such processing ease  the so called processing ﬂuency.
For example, we like things better the more often we see them (because
we can process them more easily) and when our cognitive processes go
smoothly, it makes us feel good.
The current dissertation addresses diﬀerent aspects of such process-
ing ﬂuency. Whereas previous research has focused on ﬂuency experi-
ences based on abstract information processing (thinking), the research
underlying this dissertation explored whether ﬂuency, its aﬀective con-
sequences can also be caused by actual or simulated physical interac-
tions with objects (doing). The underlying hypothesis is therefore
that smooth and eﬀortless interactions should trigger feelings of ﬂuency
and generally a positive aﬀective response.
Chapter 2 demonstrates that ﬂuency can indeed be grounded in the
motor system. In two laboratory experiments, participants had to act
on objects that appeared on a computer screen. These actions were
either compatible with the objects' implied orientation, such as a right-
hand action on a cup whose handle was oriented toward the right, or
they were not compatible, such as a right-hand action when the cup's
handle was oriented to the left. The results show that after the easier,
Sensible Moves
compatible actions, participants experienced more positive aﬀect and a
feeling of ﬂuency than after the more diﬃcult, incompatible actions.
Building on these results, Chapter 3 poses the question whether the
mere anticipation of motor ﬂuency is enough to drive an individual's
preferences, such that the easiest course of action is preferred. Partici-
pants in two experiments imagined that they were to play table-tennis
and had to pick a side to play at. Participants playing with their right
hand preferred the right side, whereas participants playing with their
left hand preferred the left side. This occurred for participants' natural
handedness and for an experimental manipulation of the play-hand. In
other words, people preferred the side that was most accessible and easy
to go to  although this factor should be irrelevant as both sides were
in fact equal. These results suggest that people use such physical cues
to make preference judgments and that these cues diﬀer as individuals
diﬀer in their physical makeup, such as being right- or left-handed, or
as the situational constraints change.
Chapter 2 and 3 therefore demonstrate that physical interactions 
or even the mere anticipation of such interactions can give rise to ﬂu-
ency eﬀects. However, recent theories of cognition propose that also
more abstract processes, such as language comprehension, involve the
motor system. Reading a sentence like The lemon tastes sour. implies
no real, physical interaction with an object. Nevertheless, perceptual
theories of knowledge propose that even the way we understand lan-
guage relies on perceptual variables. Accordingly, we derive meaning
from concepts by (partially) re-enacting relevant experiences we have
had with them. For example, when oﬀered a glass of lemon juice, one
might particularly think about how lemons taste sour. However, while
arranging a lemon with other fruits to prepare a nice fruit basket, the
current representation of the concept lemon might include its shape
(where would the lemon ﬁt) or its color (it might look nicer next to
a red apple than next to a yellow banana) rather than its taste. The
research in Chapter 4 therefore addresses whether conceptual thought
can give rise to ﬂuency experiences. Assuming that concept represen-
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tations indeed hinge upon the re-enactment of perceptual variables, we
hypothesized that the more diﬀerent sensory modalities (such as taste,
vision, or touch) are involved in the representation of a concept, the
easier it should be to derive its meaning. Experiencing this processing
ease should then again trigger ﬂuency eﬀects. The results of two exper-
iments support this prediction: Participants experienced positive aﬀect
after processing a series of words from a multitude of sensory modalities
as compared to a single sensory modality and they rated concepts as
more positive when these had been paired with attributes from diﬀer-
ent sensory modalities as compared to when they had been paired with
attributes from a single modality.
Finally, the research in Chapter 5 more generally explores the func-
tional value of processing ﬂuency. The underlying assumption is that
cognitive processes aren't a random phenomenon of the mind, but that
any cognitive process serves action  or at least its preparation. There-
fore, ﬂuency in all its variants is functional because it shows us that
things are going the way they should. They feel good. However, from
this perspective, disﬂuency should be particularly relevant for us because
it signals us that things are not going as they should. Disﬂuent processes
feel wrong or even bad. Therefore, whenever we experience disﬂuency,
we should (want to) engage in self-regulatory acts to change something
in the situation at hand. Two experiments in Chapter 5 explore this
hypothesis. The results support the view that ﬂuency experiences are
in fact related to self-regulation.
Overall, the current dissertation discusses experimental research ex-
ploring diﬀerent antecedents and consequences of processing ﬂuency,
involving sensorimotor ﬂuency, anticipated action ﬂuency, conceptual
ﬂuency, and perceptual ﬂuency.
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Samenvatting
Zinvol Reageren
Elke dag zijn we onder invloed van onze gedachten. Hierbij is het niet
alleen van belang waarover we nadenken, maar ook hoe makkelijk ons
zulke denkprocessen van de hand gaan of hoe makkelijk we nieuwe infor-
matie kunnen verwerken. Talloze onderzoeksresultaten tonen aan dat
het gemak van onze cognitieve processen  de zogenaamde ﬂuency  ver-
gaande gevolgen kan hebben. Bijvoorbeeld houden we meer van dingen
die we vaak zien (en die daarom makkelijk te verwerken of te begrijpen
zijn) en als we cognitieve processen goed beheersen, voelen we ons zelf
beter.
In dit proefschrift werden verschillende aspecten van ﬂuency onder-
zocht. Terwijl eerder onderzoek focust op ﬂuency ervaringen op basis
van abstracte informatieverwerking (denken), is dit onderzoek gericht
op de vraag of ﬂuency (en de daarmee verbonden stemmingswisseling)
veroorzaakt kan zijn door echte of gesimuleerde belichaamde interacties
(doen).
De fundamentele hypothese van dit onderzoek is dat interacties die
vloeiend, soepel en moeiteloos verlopen een gevoel van ﬂuency veroorza-
ken en in het algemeen een positieve aﬀectieve reactie opwekken.
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Hoofdstuk 2 toont aan dat ﬂuency ervaringen wel degelijk in het mo-
torisch systeem kunnen baseren. Proefpersonen in twee laboor experi-
menten moesten reageren op objecten die op een computerbeeldscherm
verschenen. De vereisten bewegingen waren óf compatibel met de oriën-
tatie van deze objecten, bijvoorbeeld een beweging met de rechterhand
naar een koﬃekop met het oortje naar rechts, of de bewegingen waren in-
compatibel met de oriëntatie van de objecten, bijvoorbeeld een beweging
met de rechterhand naar een koﬃekop met het oortje naar links. Uit de
resultaten van deze experimenten blijkt dat de proefpersonen zich posi-
tiever voelen na de makkelijkere, compatibele acties. De proefpersonen
gaven ook aan een ﬂuency gevoel te ervaren na deze acties.
Gebaseerd op deze resultaten is Hoofdstuk 3 gericht op de vraag
of alleen de verwachting van een makkelijke beweging tegenover een
moeizame beweging al voldoende is om de voorkeur voor bepaalde acties
te beïnvloeden. De hypothese was dat men een voorkeur zou moeten
hebben voor de actie die de minste hoeveelheid moeite zou vereisen.
Proefpersonen in twee experimenten verbeelden zich dat ze tafeltennis
zouden gaan spelen en dat ze een kant moesten kiezen waar ze wilden
spelen. Proefpersonen die met hun rechterhand gingen spelen hadden
een voorkeur voor de rechterkant en proefpersonen die met hun linker-
hand gingen spelen hadden een voorkeur voor de linkerkant. Dit resul-
taat werd zowel aangetoond bij de dominante hand van de proefpersonen
(dus of ze normaliter ook met de rechter- of linkerhand zouden spelen),
maar ook als de hand waarmee ze zouden spelen experimenteel gemanip-
uleerd was. Met andere woorden, de proefpersonen hadden een voorkeur
voor de kant die het meest toegankelijk was, waar ze op een makkelijke
manier naartoe zouden kunnen gaan  terwijl deze factor irrelevant was
omdat beide kanten eigenlijk gelijk waren. Deze bevindingen duiden
aan dat men belichaamde signalen gebruikt om een voorkeurbeslissing
te nemen en dat deze signalen verschillen voor mensen als deze een an-
dere fysische opmaak hebben, zoals het rechts- of linkshandig te zijn.
Bovenal hangen deze signalen kennelijk af van de omstandigheden of
situatie van het moment.
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In het geheel wordt in de Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 aangetoond dat be-
lichaamde interacties  of zelfs alleen maar de verwachting van zulke
interacties  ﬂuency eﬀecten kunnen opwekken. Echter stellen recente
theorieën van cognitie dat zelfs meer abstracte processen zoals taalbegrip
het motorische systeem involveren. Er zijn geen echte, fysieke interacties
betrokken als je een zin als De limoen smaakt zuur. leest. Toch stellen
perceptuele theorieën van cognitie dat de manier waarop we taal begri-
jpen gebaseerd is op waarnemingsvariabelen. Volgens deze theorieën
begrijpen wij de betekenis van concepten door relevante ervaringen met
deze concepten (gedeeltelijk) te reconstrueren. Bijvoorbeeld, als iemand
ons een glas limoensap aanbiedt, denken we misschien eraan dat limoe-
nen zuur smaken. Maar als we een limoen samen met anderen stukken
fruit in een schaal neerzetten, houdt onze representatie van het concept
limoen misschien meer zijn vorm in (waar zou hij goed passen), of
zijn kleur (het zou beter uitzien naast een rode appel dan naast een gele
banaan), dan de smaak. In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt de vraag gesteld of zulke
denkprocessen tot ﬂuency ervaringen kunnen leiden. Gebaseerd op de
aanname dat de aanwezigheid van concepten inderdaad variabelen in de
waarneming kent, wordt gesuggereerd dat het eenvoudiger zou moeten
zijn om de betekenis van concepten te begrijpen als deze zijn gekop-
peld aan ervaringen van meerdere zintuigen (bijvoorbeeld smaak, het
gezichtsvermogen, en de tastzin). De ervaring van dit gemak in de ver-
werking van concepten zou dan weer ﬂuency eﬀecten moeten induceren.
De bevindingen uit twee experimenten ondersteunen deze hypothesen:
Proefpersonen ervoeren een positief gevoel nadat ze zinnen hebben ver-
werkt die aan verschillende zintuigen waren gekoppeld  in vergelijking
met zinnen die aan één zintuig waren gekoppeld. Bovendien hebben de
proefpersonen concepten als positiever geëvalueerd als deze met eigen-
schappen van verschillende zintuigen waren geassocieerd dan als deze
met eigenschappen vanuit een enkel zintuig waren geassocieerd.
Tot slot wordt in Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoek voorgesteld over de al-
gemene functie van ﬂuency ervaringen. Gebaseerd op de aanname dat
cognitieve processen geen willekeurig fenomeen van de geest zijn, maar
dat ze in feite ertoe dienen om te kunnen (re)ageren  of om acties voor
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te bereiden, wordt verondersteld dat ﬂuency in alle varianten function-
eel is omdat het aangeeft dat de dingen verlopen zoals ze moeten. Het
voelt goed. Vanuit dit perspectief zou de ervaring van disﬂuency vooral
relevant zijn omdat het betekent dat dingen niet zo lopen als gepland of
verwacht. Het voelt verkeerd of zelfs slecht. Daarom zou de ervaring
van disﬂuency altijd een aanleiding zou moeten zijn om zelfregulatie te
beoefenen en de situatie te veranderen. Twee experimenten in Hoodstuk
5 onderzoeken deze hypothese. De resultaten ondersteunen het idee dat
ﬂuency ervaringen gerelateerd zijn aan zelfregulatie.
In totaal behandelt het voorliggende proefschrift experimenteel on-
derzoek naar verschillende voorwaarden en gevolgen van ﬂuency, onder
andere belichaamde ﬂuency ervaringen, verwachte ﬂuency, conceptuele
ﬂuency, en perceptuele ﬂuency.
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Sinnvoll Agieren
Im Alltag werden wir ständig durch unsere Gedanken beeinﬂusst. Über-
raschenderweise spielt es hierbei nicht allein eine Rolle, was wir denken
oder worüber wir nachdenken, sondern auch, wie leicht wir diese Gedan-
ken formen und wie einfach wir neue Informationen verarbeiten können.
Zahlreiche Forschungsergebnisse demonstrieren die weitreichenden Ef-
fekte solcher Verarbeitungsleichtigkeit, der sogenannten Verarbeitungs-
ﬂüssigkeit. Beispielsweise mögen wir Dinge mehr, je häuﬁger wir sie
sehen (da sie einfacher zu verarbeiten oder begreifen sind) und wenn
unsere kognitiven Prozesse glatt verlaufen, fühlen wir uns gut.
Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht verschiedene Aspekte dieser
Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit. Während sich die bisherige Forschung zur Er-
fahrung von Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit auf abstrakte Informationsverar-
beitungsprozesse konzentriert (Denken), erforscht die vorliegende Ar-
beit ob Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit und die damit verbundenen aﬀektiven
Folgen auch durch körperliche Interaktionen hervorgerufen werden kön-
nen (Tun). Dabei geht es um tatsächliche oder simulierte Interaktio-
nen. Die zugrunde liegende Hypothese besagt, dass mühelos und glatt
ablaufende Interaktionen ein Gefühl der Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit und im
allgemeinen eine positive aﬀektive Reaktion hervorrufen.
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Kapitel 2 zeigt, dass Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit tatsächlich im mo-
torischen System verankert sein kann. In zwei Laborexperimenten muss-
ten Probanden mit Gegenständen interagieren, die auf einem Bildschirm
angezeigt wurden. Die erforderlichen Handlungen waren entweder kom-
patibel mit der Ausrichtung des Gegenstandes, wie zum Beispiel mit
der rechten Hand nach einer Tasse zu greifen, deren Henkel nach rechts
zeigt, oder die Handlungen waren inkompatibel mit der Ausrichtung der
Tasse, beispielsweise wenn man mit der rechten Hand nach einer Tasse
greifen muss, deren Henkel nach links zeigt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass
die Versuchsteilnehmer sich nach den einfacheren, kompatiblen Hand-
lungen positiver fühlten und ein Gefühl der Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit er-
fuhren.
Aufgrund dieser Ergebnisse befasst sich Kapitel 3 mit der Frage, ob
die bloße Erwartung motorischer Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit ausreicht, um
die Vorlieben einer Person zu beeinﬂussen, sodass die einfachste Hand-
lung bevorzugt wird. In zwei Experimenten stellten sich Probanden
vor, dass sie Tischtennis spielen würden und erst wählen müssten, auf
welcher Seite sie spielen wollen. Probanden, die mit ihrer rechten Hand
spielten, bevorzugten überwiegend die rechte Seite des Tischtennistis-
ches, während Probanden, die mit der linken Hand spielten, die linke
Seite bevorzugten. Diese Ergebnisse wurden sowohl für die dominante
Hand der Probanden gefunden (ob sie regulär mit der rechten oder linken
Hand spielen würden) also auch für eine experimentelle Manipulation
der Spielhand. Mit anderen Worten bevorzugten die Probanden jeweils
die Seite, die am zugänglichsten war, zu der sie am einfachsten hingehen
konnten  obwohl dieser Faktor eigentlich irrelevant war, da beide Seiten
gleich waren. Dieser Befund lässt darauf schließen, dass man körperliche
Signale benutzt um Präferenzurteile zu fällen und dass diese Signale sich
je nach Körperbau (beispielsweise für Links- und Rechtshänder) oder
Situation unterscheiden können.
Die Kapitel 2 und 3 zeigen daher, dass körperliche Interaktionen 
und sogar die bloße Erwartung solcher Interaktionen  ein Gefühl der
Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit hervorrufen können. Allerdings schlagen neuere
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Kognitionstheorien vor, dass das motorische System auch bei abstrak-
teren Prozesse wie etwa dem Verständnis von Sprache eine Rolle spielt.
Wenn man eine Satz wie Die Zitrone schmeckt sauer. liest, impliziert
dies keine echte körperliche Interaktion mit einer Zitrone. Trotzdem
gehen wahrnehmungsbasierte Kognitionstheorien davon aus, dass die
Art und Weise wie wir Sprache verstehen von Wahrnehmungsvariablen
abhängt. Demzufolge leiten wir die Bedeutung eines Konzeptes ab, in-
dem wir relevante Erfahrungen mit dem Konzept (teilweise) rekonstru-
ieren. Zum Beispiel, wenn uns jemand ein Glas Zitronensaft anbietet,
denken wir besonders daran, dass Zitronen sauer schmecken. Wenn wir
allerdings Zitronen mit anderen Früchten in einer Obstschale arrang-
ieren, beinhaltet unsere Repräsentation des Konzepts Zitrone vielle-
icht eher ihre Form (wo würde die Zitrone hinpassen) oder ihre Farbe
(sie würde neben dem roten Apfel besser aussehen als neben einer gel-
ben Banane) statt ihres Geschmacks. Die Forschung, die in Kapitel 4
beschrieben ist, befasst sich daher mit der Frage, ob auch konzeptionelles
Denken Gefühle der Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit hervorrufen kann. Unter
der Annahme, dass die Repräsentation von Konzepten tatsächlich von
der Rekonstruktion von Wahrnehmungsvariablen abhängt, haben wir
vorhergesagt, dass es einfacher sein sollte, die Bedeutung eines Konzeptes
abzuleiten, je mehr verschiedene Sinne (wie der Geschmacksinn, der
Sehsinn oder der Tastsinn) in der Repräsentation des Konzepts involviert
sind. Die Erfahrung dieser Verarbeitungsleichtigkeit sollte wiederum Ve-
rarbeitungsﬂüssigkeitseﬀekte hervorrufen. Die Resultate von zwei Ex-
perimenten stützen diese Hypothesen: die Probanden erfuhren ein pos-
itives Gefühl, nachdem sie eine Reihe Sätzen bearbeitet hatten, die von
einer Vielzahl verschiedener Sinne kamen im Vergleich zu der Verar-
beitung von Sätzen, die mit nur einem Sinn assoziiert waren. Darüber
hinaus bewerteten die Probanden Konzeptwörter als positiver, wenn
diese mit Attributen aus verschiedenen Sinnen gekoppelt waren als wenn
diese mit Attributen aus nur einem Sinn gekoppelt waren.
Die Forschung in Kapitel 5 sondiert schließlich die Funktion von Ve-
rarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit im Allgemeinen. Die zugrundeliegende Annahme
ist, dass kognitive Prozesse kein zufälliges Phänomen des Geistes sind,
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sondern dass jeder kognitive Prozess dazu dient, handeln zu können oder
Handlungen vorzubereiten. Daher ist die Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit in all
ihren Variationen funktional, weil sie uns zeigt, dass die Dinge so laufen,
wie sie sollten. Es fühlt sich gut an. Andererseits, sollte das Gegenteil
dieser Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit ebenso relevant für uns sein, da es uns
signalisiert, dass die Dinge nicht so laufen, wie sie sollten. Es fühlt
sich verkehrt an oder sogar schlecht. Daher sollte eine solche Erfahrung
uns grundsätzlich ermutigen, Selbstkontrolle auszuüben um etwas an
der momentanen Situation zu verändern. Zwei Experimente in Kapitel
5 untersuchen diese Hypothese. Die Ergebnisse unterstützen die Idee,
dass es tatsächlich einen Zusammenhang gibt zwischen der Erfahrung
von Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit und Prozessen der Selbstregulation.
Insgesamt beschäftigt sich die vorliegende Dissertation mit experi-
menteller Forschung zu verschiedenen Bedingungen und Folgen der Ve-
rarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit, unter anderem sensomotorischer Verarbeitungs-
ﬂüssigkeit, erwarteter Handlungsﬂüssigkeit, konzeptioneller Verarbei-
tungsﬂüssigkeit und wahnehmungsbasierter Verarbeitungsﬂüssigkeit.
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On the Relevance of
Signiﬁcant Numbers
Experimental social psychology is a quantitative science. Of course,
that means that numbers are important. However, little did I know
about the actual relevance of numbers when I embarked on the project
of writing a dissertation over four years ago. I learned quickly that
nothing is more important than the smallest and most magical number
of all: 0.05. The continuous lack of this tiny number during the ﬁrst two
years of this project was therefore not only cause for concern, but also
triggered attempts to set a new record of producing the largest number
possible: We tried out ﬁve diﬀerent topics and conducted a total of 46
experiments involving 2992 participants. A big thanks to them!
More importantly, two special people deserve my gratitude.
Gün  Despite your constant state of being ﬂabbergasted at my
ability to produce insigniﬁcant results, you never ceased to believe that
the next experiment would ﬁnally work. I admire your passion about
research and your ability to produce an inﬁnite number of research ideas.
Moreover, I am grateful for the freedom to deﬁne my own path and to
create my own identity as a scientist.
Micha  You had the courage to step into a project about which
you knew almost nothing  other than that it wasn't going very well. I
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thank you for that. I learned a lot from your insight into the practical
matters of setting up an experiment and about having the right nose for
what will work in the lab and what won't. (Things certainly became a
lot more ﬂuent after you joined us.)
Moreover, I am indebted to innumerous colleagues and friends for
their feedback, ideas, and criticism on my research  at the VU and at
KLI meetings. You have certainly provided me with food for thought to
improve my research (to recalculate)  and also oﬀered the necessary
distractions, coﬀee breaks, and let's-whine-about-the-rollercoaster-PhD-
life-sessions whenever necessary (to recalibrate). Special thanks go to
Kaska, Hester, and Hans in this respect and to Monique (your continuing
passion about science keeps amazing me). I'm also grateful to Carla,
Clare, and Wilco for the warm welcome into the SOPS family and to
Niels van Doesum for all his excellent translations without which my
research wouldn't have been possible.
Besides all these scientiﬁc numbers and ﬁgures, I want to extend a
great warm hug to the cowboys and cowgirls of the Pink Pony Ranch.
Dear Csilla, Christoph, Henrike, and Andreas  It's amazing and in-
credible to have you in my life. Within the craziness of writing this
dissertation you have kept me sane  or rather always provided the
proper balance of outside-of-science insanity. I could not imagine (a
fun) life without you and couldn't ask for better friends.
Liebe Anna, Amber und Paula, vielen Dank für die tolle Zeit und
dass Ihr mich so nett aufgenommen und adoptiert habt. Ich hätte mir
keine besseren Mitbewohner(tjes) vorstellen können. Nichts war besser,
als einen Arbeitstag mit Schnappi ausklingen zu lassen.
Moreover, when speaking of numbers the origin is of natural rele-
vance, in this case my family. Liebe Mama, lieber Papa, liebe Julia,
von Euch habe ich immer jede erdenkbare Möglichkeit erhalten. Eure
bedingungslose Liebe und Euer unerschütterliche Glaube an mich waren
immer eine große Stütze  auch zum Fertigstellen dieser Dissertation.
Liebe Uschi, lieber Uwe, vielen Dank für die vielen Stunden der Ablen-
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kung mit den Alten und dem Charly - und natürlich für die Bereitstel-
lung dieses köstlichen schwarzen Lebenselixiers. (Ihr habt mich ja sowas
von angeﬁxt!)
Last but not least: Jens  You are and have been the one and only
constant. You give meaning to it all, without you my life would be
chaos. And the most signiﬁcant number of all, the ultimate Number 1
to which nothing compares: Nele.
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